North Dakota Law Review
Volume 43

Number 4

Article 2

1967

Wholesome Neutrality: Law and Education
Joseph F. Costanzo

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Costanzo, Joseph F. (1967) "Wholesome Neutrality: Law and Education," North Dakota Law Review: Vol.
43 : No. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol43/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

WHOLESOME

NEUTRALITY:
EDUCATION

JOSEPH

F

LAW AND

COSTANZO, S. J.*

In September, 1963, a suit was filed in Anne Arundel circuit
court, Annapolis, Maryland, titled, The Horace Mann League of the
United States of America et al, plaintiffs, v. J Millard Tawes,
Governor et al, defendants, which set into motion the judicial process on a critical question of law whose ultimate determination
will bear far-reaching consequences for education in America. After
a year of pretrial depositions the court trial opened in November,
1964, with Judge 0. Bowie Duckett presiding. At issue was the
constitutionality of an appropriation by the Maryland legislature of
$2.5 million for four Maryland church-related colleges--750,000 to
Notre Dame of Baltimore, $750,000 to St. Joseph's College of Emmitsburg for science buildings, $500,000 to Methodist-related Western
Maryland College in Westminister for a science building and dining
hall, and $500,000 to Hood College m Frederick, related to the
United Church of Christ, for a dormitory.
The Maryland case represents a change in political and legal
tactics for the opponents of public support for educational institutions under religious auspices. In the preceding years, they concentrated their instrumentalities of influence upon members of the
national and state legislatures. But aid in one form or another
and for a variety of specified purposes which were identified as
a legislative concern of public interest were extended to educational
facilities under church sponsorship. They were judged to be no
less efficacious and competent than the nonreligious institutions of
learning in realizing the educational objectives set down by the
legislators. Besides, the nationwide debate on the constitutionality
Associate Professor of Political Philosophy and Constitutional Law, Fordham University A.B. 1938, Georgetown University; 3LA. 1939, Ph.D. 1949, Fordham University. ordained 1944.
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of these subventions in law journals, before congressional committees, and on televised forums, brought to the fore the fact that
scholars, jurists, and men of high public repute were to be found
no less on the side which upheld their constitutionality as there
were in the opposite camp. Surveys and polls of public opinion
showed a steady decline in the public persuasion and political influence of the opponents. With a shift of preponderance from one
side to the other, the opponents hopefully concentrated on winning
the legal battle in the courts. In the legal forum there is a change
of tactic too. Whereas Mr Marbury, the chief counsel for the defendants in the Maryland case argued that several Supreme Court
decisions established a precedent that public aid is constitutionally
permissable if a church-related institution performs "a legitimate
secular function that does not advance or prohibit religion," Mr.
Pfeffer contended for the plaintiffs that Judge Duckett must apply
a different constitutional test-that tax support cannot be given to
institutions "which either teach or practice religion." The Maryland case was carefully chosen by Mr Edgar Fuller, an official of
the Horace Mann League, and his associates. First, inasmuch as the
grants involved are made directly from the state to the colleges
the more appealing student-benefit argument may be avoided.
Secondly, the four institutions represent two Protestant affiliations
as well as two Catholic and in this wise the usual concentration of
legal attack upon Catholics subtly suggestive of discriminatory bias
is shunned.
On March 11, 1965, Judge 0. Bowie Duckett handed down his
ruling that the Statutes mentioned in the Bill of Complaint are valid
and constitutional.1 On June 2, 1966, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in a four to three decision 2 reversed for three of the
colleges but upheld the constitutional permissiveness of the state
grant to Hood College on the basis of tests which weighted the
degree of relationship of the educational institution to church or
religious regulation. The Supreme Court has declined to review
the ruling of the Maryland Court of Appeals. In the expectation
that eventually a similar issue will come before the high tribunal
we here undertake to examine pertinent cases of the United States
Supreme Court and try to ascertain what constitutional premises
may be controlling on this great issue of governmental financial
aid to church-related institutions of learning. For the moment, the
refusal to review the Court of Appeals ruling leaves us with a
presumption in favdr of that ruling but it is a rebuttable presumption and in the hope that it may someday be contravened by the
1. The Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. J. Millard Tawes,
Governor et al. No. 15, 850 Equity, March 11, 1965, Judge 0. Bowie Duckett.
2. Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. Board of Public Works
of Maryland, 242 Md. 646, 220 A.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1966).
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Supreme Court of the United States we undertake to discuss this
issue at length. It takes only a modicum of perception to see how
epoch-making the Supreme Court decision on such an issue would
be. The alternatives which the Supreme Court may have to consider are three: (1) whether the colleges in question are essentially
educational institutions despite or together with their religious affiliation and therefore they may receive tax funds; (2) whether
such tax support is violative of the nonestablishment prohibition of
the First Amendment and therefore they may not be recipients of
government subventions; (3) whether a line must be drawn, as the
Court of Appeals of Maryland did, between church relationship and
church control-admittedly, an extremely difficult canon of application.
A FREE STATE AND A FREE CHURCH
Some prefatory reflections must be stated m order to be alert
to distracting or misleading considerations customarily made in a
discussion of this problem.
The Constitution does not mention the word "church" nor
"state" in the generic sense except in the Second Amendment, in
which a "well regulated militia" is asserted to be "necessary to
the security of a free state." The principle of separation of church
and state and the "wall of separation" are nonlegal terms which
better fit the European (and Middle East and Oriental) historic
experience from which Americans have gradually disengaged themselves since colonial times. The resort to the historical past does
not enlighten if it serves to evoke fears and premonitions out of
tune with the times and popular sensibilities. Americans have a
right to fashion their own constitutional history in church-state relations without being burdened by memories of religious wars and
animosities of their distant forebears. Many of the foreboding
nuances of the historic church-state relations might be avoided if
we spoke more accurately of the relations between the temporal and
spiritual lives of the American community to the extent that they
come under the regulations of public law in America. We have
religious pluralism and a multiplicity of churches with none of which
any of our fifty-one state and federal governments have a concordat
or legal establishment as state religion. But the term, "separation
of church and state" is here to stay by popular usage. Strictly
speaking, church-state relations are not in any positive way defined
or formulated by the Constitution. The twin religious clauses of the
federal First Amendment and similar provisions in state constitutions are stated in negative terms-what these governments may
not do-between the confines of these prohibitions and the courts,
both state and federal, have evolved the positive affirmations of
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permissive and required relations between state and the religious
conscience. The controversary which has been raging in recent
times must be dated with the celebrated dictum of Justice Black
in Everson v Board of Education:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church, nor can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another Neither can force or influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No persons can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
preach religion. Neither a state nor the federal government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organization or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion was
intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and
state.'"
Several summary observations may here be made. It is Justice
Black's broad interdiction against any aid to religion which contrary to a great variety of governmental legislative provisions for
religion, religious activities, and public services conducted by
religious agencies and institutions and offers the greatest diffculty
of constitutional construction unless its literal comprehensiveness
becomes less than absolute when contracted by the constitutional
permissiveness of the specific ruling. Secondly, some of the doctrinaire generalizations have inserted unresolved antinomy between
members of the Court. In Everson,4 McCollum," and Zorach,O
the Court with the exception of Justice Reed, subscribed to the
formulation of nonestablishment by Justice Black but then split five
to four in this specific ruling in Everson and in Zorach in the
particular application. Thirdly, Justice Black's interpretation of the
nonestablishment clause includes elements that properly are inherent to the free exercise of religion guarantee. This is not without
significance for in succeeding cases the Court is alert to the fact
that the nonestablishment prohibition is not to be so understood or
applied as to infringe upon the equally inviolable constitutional
guarantee of religious liberty This conduces the Court to a competing of interests calculation in particular instances and weighs its
3.
4.
5.
6.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-6 (1947).
Ibid.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Zorach v. Clauson, 843 U.S. 806 (1952).
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favor to the religious liberty concept. Fourth, the sum total of the
prohibitions does constitute absolute separation between the government and the spiritual life of the American community It denies
to the government both competence and jurisdiction to operate a
church, to define dogma, or to participate in the internal affairs
of the church. And conversely, it denies by implication that it is
the function of the churches to run the government. These negations
are those constitutionally guaranteed conditions which serve the
cause of freedom-freedom and independence of the state and its
legitimate activities from dictation and imposition by the churches
on political governance-freedom and independence of the churches
from governmental interposition in church government, in the definition of creeds, and the right to proselytyze without coercive powerfreedom of the individual to believe or not to believe, to attend or
not to attend church services except as his conscience impels him
to do so. It is not a separation that spells indifference. On the
contrary, external conduct attributed to religious creeds are not
outside the reach of the police powers of the state.
No government in modern history has affirmed so frequently
in corporate and individual official pronouncements on the most
memorable and solemn occasions belief in and dependence upon
God as the author of its liberties and reliance upon divine providence for civic peace, order, and good government, as has the
American government.
This moral nexus between religious and civic life enjoys preferment status in law Churches, seminaries, monasteries, convents,
synagogues, and rabbinical schools are given tax preferment and
tax deductible benefits by law, the clergy and students of the ministry are exempt from military service, both in peace and war,
state and federal governments provide for chaplains to invoke God's
blessings and guidance upon legislative deliberations. These preferment benefits are an acknowledgement by law that religious life
is a necessary beneficient influence for the promotion of civic virtue
and religious institutions are considered as tributory to civic peace,
law, and order. The legal preferments through tax exemption and
tax deductible benefits in favor of religious life are to clearly distinguished from similar benefits that educational and social welfare
affiliates of the churches enjoy under a statutory law in common
with other nonprofit organizations. Legislative chaplaincies and
military exemptions for students of the ministry as well as for the
ordained clergy bears no other parallel with secular institutions.
The plain fact is that the state and federal governments and
the churches are mutually reliant upon one another in order to
enjoy the freedom and independence that results from "separation."
The churches are no less beneficiaries of the facilities of the ad-

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

ministration of justice than other associations, commercial, industrial, cultural, etc. Where church schools have not adequate recreational facilities, municipal authorities have roped off the streets for
their students to play, deflecting the unrestrained flow of public
traffic. Public proselytizing in parks, street corners, and distribution
of religious literature in person even to the inconvenience of tenants
has been upheld by the courts. In turn, the churches are called
upon to testify before congressional committees to give their counsel
on domestic and foreign affairs, and to assist m the moral enlightenment of their congregations on the inviolability of the rights of
others against deeply rooted bias and prejudice. We may note here
that it is misleading to refer to all litigations as church-state cases.
The generality of cases are not between the juridical entities but
between a government and an individual who in his moral character as the subject of natural rights invokes his rights of conscience
under the religious liberty clause and between the government and
a citizen, or corporation, as the subject of legal rights claiming
he ought not to be excluded as a beneficiary from general welfare
provisions because of his exercise of religious liberty in the fulfillment of a civic purpose defined by the government.
There is too, a concurrence of identical interests between government and religious agencies. Historically, the care of the poor, the
infirm, and of dependents and other works of corporal mercy have
been the principal burden of churches and religious organizations.
Gradually, the state has assumed more and more of these temporal
cares but not with the intent of preempting the field. Rather, it
has subsidized on a pro rata basis, the care of the ages, the mfirm, incurables, the blind, deaf, mutes, the orphaned, and the wayward under the care of religious agencies, and acknowledged the
need of religious solace for the sorely afflicted. In 1894, the State
of Louisiana invited Catholic Nuns, the Daughters of Charity, to
help care for the afflicted at the leprosarium at Carville. When
the federal government took over in 1921, the Sisters remained in
this charitable employment. The federal Hill-Burton Act makes
grants for the new construction and expansion of hospital facilities
to all qualified hospitals, and of those under religious auspices constitute a major number of the total.
There is, too, a concurrence of functions between government
and religious agencies because both jurisdictions fall upon one and
the same subject in his dual capacity, the individual person, as
believer and citizen. This occurs, for example, in the areas of
marriage and divorce laws, education and birth control programs.
This mutual involvement of civic and ecclesiastical jurisdictions is
unavoidable because such matters touch upon personal conscience
and the outward conduct correspondent to religious confession. It
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is not difficult to see in what sense there is absolute separation of
church and state-there is to be no jurisdictional, institutional, or
functional fusion of the two authorities, civil and religious. This
separation is to ensure freedom of conscience for the believer (and
nonbeliever) and for the churches and their religious apostolate and
activities. It is a freedom which makes possible a cooperation that
is vigorous because independent of interference from the other
Cooperation may and does take expression in a variety of forms.
It may be an accommodation that is required because its denial
would restrict the exercise of religious liberty (as m the Jehovah
Witnesses 7 and Sherbert v Verner8 cases), an accommodation
that is prohibited because it is considered to be constructively an
establishment of religion (as in McCollum, Engels,9 and Schempp"0
cases), an accommodation which is permitted because it assists
religious life without entailing the constitutionally forbidden establishment (Everson, Zorach) Where a public service is involved, the
the government must not use a religious exclusionary norm (Bradfield," Cochran, 2 Everson, Torcaso13 ) but must observe strict
neutrality as between believer and nonbeliever Nor may a religious exclusionary norm be used if the secular, i.e., civic general welfare purpose is achieved in such a way that it unavoidably does
entrail as an overflow a discernible benefit to the religious life
(Bradfield, Pierce,4 Cochran, Everson, the Sunday Closing Laws
cases) One cannot deny that religious life does enjoy a variety
of public privileges which may rightly be said to encourage religious
life if not confer upon it a privileged status. And where a conflict between competing interests emerges between the interplay of
the twin religious clauses, the Court has weighed the scales in favor
of the free exercise of religion.
CANONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION

Bearing in mind that there are a number of concurring functions
of interest between governments and religious agencies and unavoidably an interplay of the two religious clauses involving the individual both as a believer and as a subject of the government we
ask what may we find in court decisions of the past to shed light
on the constitutionality of federal aid to church schools. There is
no court ruling on this precise issue. While Bradfield v Roberts, 5
Cochran v Board of Educatton,16 and Everson v Board of
7.
8.
9.
10.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962).

11.

Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).

12.
13.
14.
15.

Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 982 (1963).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Supra note 11.
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Education,'7 are the only three decisions of the Supreme Court
which bear more relevance to our discussion than do the others,
we will review a number of other cases in order to ascertain if
in any reasonable way our precise issue is at least broadly adumbrated in the reasonings of the opinions of the Justices.
Bradfield v Roberts
In 1899, the Supreme Court upheld in a unanimous decision
the constitutionality of federal appropriations of funds for the construction of a building and public recompense for services rendered
to a hospital owned and administered by Roman Catholic Sisters.
Presumably the Hill-Burton Hospital Survey and Construction Act
which has been repeatedly renewed since its enactment in 1946 rests
squarely upon the ruling in Bradfield that such federal subventions
are not in violation of the nonestablishment clause. One cannot
argue conclusively from Bradfield that what is upheld in the noneducational area-hospital services and facilities-would necessarily
apply to the area of education. But allowing for the obvious differences between educational and medical situations nevertheless
appropriations for an officially recognized public service might be
favorably constructed into an analogous constitutional principle for
gauging the public interest of an officially accredited schooling. Nor
has any constitutional embarrassment come from acknowledging that
some benefit does accrue to the private religious corporation, and
in certain instances the benefit is almost incalculable to the fortune of an affiliate educational institution of learning.' s Bradfield
supplied the constitutional rationale in an area of concurrent or
overlapping functions. Federal and state governments in disbursing
funds and property for specified objectives that come within their
powers to provide and spend for the general welfare, have extended
financial assistance impartially to all agencies and institutions,
religious' s or secular, who can fulfill the legislative intent and so
16. Supra note 12.
17. Supra note 3.
18. Yeshiva, Book 396, note 105. Notes 105-109 for a discussion of the contractual arrangement between the City of New York and Yeshiva University. Cf. C0STANZO, THIS NATION UNDER GOD, 257-260, 396 (1964).
19. The Court meticulously observed in what sense the Catholic Hospital must be understood to be a church-affiliated institution and what relevance that has on public service the federal government expected from it no less. The Court pointedly makes these observations
(1). the hospital was owned by a corporation, chartered by the government
and consequently, legally speaking, the corporation was subject solely to the control "of the
government which created it." Under this aspect the corporation was secular and nonsectarian. (2). the fact that the hospital was conducted under the Auspices of the Catholic
Church meant "That the church exercises great and perhaps controlling influences over the
management of the Hospital." (3). the stockholders of the corporation were all nuns, Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 298 (1899). In the light of these admissions of fact the Supreme Court's ruling in Bradfield means that a direct appropriation of government funds
for the performance of a public function conducted under the auspices "and perhaps controlling influence" of an institution with religious professions is not in contravention of the
non-establishment clauses of the First Amendment. The Court too noted the error of confounding a "law respecting an establishment of religion" with "a law respecting a religious
establishment.
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service a public purpose. This rationale has been explained by
subsequent state court decisions to counter the customary two objections of the religious character of an institution and the overflow
of benefits to it.
In 1955 the highest court of New Hampshire upheld the constitutionality of a statue giving state aid to denominational hospitals,
for the education of nurses:
The purpose of the grant
is neither to aid any particular
sect or denomination nor all denominations, but to further
the teaching of the science of nursing.
The aid is
available to all hospitals offering training in nursing without
regard to the auspices under which they are conducted or
to the religious -beliefs of their managements, so long as the
aid is used for nurses' training 'and for no other instruction
or purpose'
If some denomination incidentally derives
a benefit through the release of other funds for other uses,
this result is immaterial.
A hospital operated under
the auspices of a religious denomination which receives
funds under the provisions of this bill acts merely as a
conduit for the expenditure of public funds for training
which serves exclusively the public purpose of public health
and is completely devoid of sectarian doctrine and purposes.
The fundamental position that public moneys shall be used
for a public purpose has not prevented the use of private
institutions
as a conduit to accomplish the public objec20

tives.

In Kentucky the Court of Appeals upheld the federal statute
against the contention that the federal-state grant to churchaffiliated hospitals violated both federal and state constitutions.
(4) private agency may be utilized as the pipe-line
through which a public expenditure is made, the test being
not who receives the money but the character of the use
for which it is expended.
The fact that members of the
governing board of these hospitals, which perform a recognized public service to all people regardless of faith or
creed, are all of one religious faith does not signify that
the money allotted the hospitals is to aid their particular
denominations,
courts will look to the use to which
these funds are put rather than the conduits through which
they run. If that use is a public one
it will not be held in
contravention of sec. 5 merely because the hospitals carry
the name or are governed by members of a particular

faith .21
The difference between religion and public health and religion
and education is not so broad as to warrant, despite certain obvious dissimilarities, a contrary attitude toward those who approve
20.
21.

Opinion of the Justices, 99 N.H. 519, 113 A.2d 114, 116 (1955).
Kentucky Building Commission v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. 1949).
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of government aid to church-affiliated schools. What the state court
rulings of New Hampshire, Kentucky, Mississippi and others have
stressed is that a public purpose can still be served through a
private agency despite or together with its patent religious profession and environment and even allowing for incidental benefits to
the religious institution itself.
22
Meyer v Nebraska

The importance of Meyer is generally overshadowed by the
momentous decision two years later of Pierce which in great part
was prejudiced by the former. In both cases, the Supreme Court
made similar observations touching upon the rights of parents to
direct the education of their children, the contractual rights of
schools and of the teaching profession as restrictions upon the
state's provisions and requirements regulating state compulsory
school attendance laws. Both cases deny state monopoly of the
educational process either by an absolute control of school curculum or by compulsory attendance at public elementary schools for
all children. But scarcely any notice has been taken of the court's
consideration of the multiple aspects of a language study which
does cast light on the tangled issues of the secular subjects as
taught in church-related schools. It quotes at length from the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that underscored the indefectibility of the study of the German language even in the very
employment of Biblical stories. The question of the constitutionality
of the state statute proscribing the teaching of German in elementary schools remains without prejudice should any appeal be
made to the freedom of religious beliefs. The high tribunal apparently agreed with the analysis of the case by the Nebraska Supreme Court-that two distinct and separate purposes remain intact-the teaching and learning of the state proscribed German
language and the teaching and learning of Bible stories. The
two concurrent objectives are recognized to be separable and separate, and accordingly, both the federal and state Supreme Courts
see no constitutional right of religious liberty at issue before them.
In a word, the German language is being taught even in the reading of Bible stories and it is on that precise issue that both courtrulings are made. Apparently the intermingling of religious matter in the teaching of a secular subject-a modern language--does
not diminish nor impair the proficiency of teaching and learning
the secular subject nor interfere with achieving its own distinctive
secular aspect and function. Taking note of the laudable motive
of promoting cultural assimilation in schools the Court however ex22.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 890 (1923).
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pressed its aversion to the statute before it by reaching back to
the Platonic and Spartan experiments by law of trying to mold the
minds of the young by removing them entirely from parental care
and submitting the youngsters to an educational process entirely
controlled by the state. It is striking that the court in speaking
of the higher importance of education among the American people
should choose to quote the Ordinance of 1787 which conjoins knowledge with religion and morality for the benefit of government and
society.

Pierce v Society of Sisterss"
Though Pierce is generally cited for its celebrated pronouncement on the rights of parents, the issue before the Court was the
proprietary right of private corporations, secular, military, and
religious, to engage in schooling in fulfillment of state compulsory
attendance laws. The Court's affirmation of the primacy of parental rights is more than a dictum because it is the necessary term
correspondent to the inviolable exercise of the private corporations'
right to engage in public education. Their rights, the Court noted,
are dependent upon patronage, "the free choice of patrons, present
and prospective." In ruling upon both cases together, the Court
in effect denied that the religious affiliation of the parochial school
distinguished it from the private school as an educational institution. The significance of Pierce is sharply defined when projected
against the background of forces which brought about the enactment of the Oregon statute. Those who worked for its enactment
argued that:
The assimilation and education of our foreign-born citizens
In the principles of our government, the hopes and aspirations of our people, are best secured by and
through at24
tendance of all children in our public schools.
The Court rejected this underlying premise that state schools are
better educational instrumentalities for inculcating civic virtues and
patriotism. We might observe on this point that church-related
23. Supra note 14.
24. The principal forces behind the Americanization campaign were led by the Imperial
Council, A.A.O. Nobles Mystic Shrine. Cf. Oregon School cases- Complete Record 732
(1925). An interesting comment upon this motivation will be found in the brief amiclAs
curiae filed in the case. by Louis Marshall on behalf of the American Jewish Committee.
"Recognizing in the main the great merits of our public schools system, it is nevertheless
unthinkable that public schools alone shall, by legislative compulsion rather than by their
own merits, be made the only medium of education in this country. Such a policy would

speedily lead to their deterioration. The absence of the right of selection would at once
lower the standards of education. If the children of the country are to be educated in
accordance with an undeviating rule of uniformity and by a single method, then eventually
our nation would consist of mechanical

robots and

standardization Babbitts. Id.

at 615

The private and parochial schools which exist throughout the country are conducted
on the same patriotic lines as are our public schools." Id. at 618. For a sharp rejection
of the charges of divisiveness leveled at parochial schools, Of. Marshall, Id., at 621-22.
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schools are, on the contrary characteristically more noted for their
patriotism. Pierce affirms the right of private corporations, whether
religious, military or secular, to operate schools for the same public
intent as the state schools. They exist not by privilege nor sufferance of the political power The basic reason for the existence
of the independent schools is that they are differentiated, by a
principle of integration of curriculum and a system of discipline,
from state-owned schools while sharing in common with them a
proficiency in required subjects and in the inculcation of civic virtues. The effect of the Pierce ruling is to deny any priority or superiority before the law for the state to compel parents to choose
the state schools.
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public schools only The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, counled with the high 25duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
It is true that the First Amendment -was never argued or even
mentioned in the Pierce ruling. But this is precisely what constitutes its unique merit. In ruling upon both cases together, the
Court in effect denied that the religious affiliation of the parochial
school distinguishes it from the private (military) school as an
educational institution capable of fulfilling a public purpose as prescribed by state educational laws. Both are subsumed as private
corporations with equally inviolable property rights not merely in
education but in public education.
Private proprietary title and church affiliation do not derogate
from nor diminish the ability to fulfill public law requirements of
school curriculum, standards of teaching, and other educational
facilities, nor render the educational process less competent, less
truly public in purpose and achievement. By denying to the state
a monopolizing role in education, it implicitly affirms that parents,
church, and the state are all contributors to public education.
Strictly speaking, it is not the religious and nonreligious conscience
that is made to prevail but it is the parental right, (correspondent
to rights of private corporations in public education), whether exercised out of religious motivation or not, that limits the state to
a partnership, and denies it an exclusive role m public education.
At the same time, while there is no explicit discussion of a principle of integration in the school curriculum, the court seems not
unmindful of it when it notes that the reason that parents may
choose an accredited education in an independent school is that in
25.

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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the judgment of the parents such schooling is ordained to assist
the student for "his destiny" and "additional obligations" beyond
those presumably provided for in the state-owned schools. The profound significance of the Pierce ruling is that the proprietary right
of independent schools to operate is related to the prime moral
obligation of the parents to regulate the moral educational process
of their children, without denying the state a supervisory role and
without removing from the independent schools their obligation to
the public welfare. In a word, the court is not merely saying that
a division of labor is legitimate, and so the state need not have
an exclusive role in education nor that other agencies besides the
state may not be equally competent to educate the young; rather
the court affirms the proprietary right of independent schools and
of its "patrons, present and prospective," to be co-participants with
the state in the educational requirements of public welfare. We
cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that of those private churchaffiliated schools who do not ask for a share in governmental
aids, none will permit critics to say they are not fulfilling the purposes of public education, none will admit that their schools are
unAmerican, divisive, undemocratic, none will agree that their educational process is defective. The reason why they exist at all
is precisely because they are firmly persuaded that the state schools
are wanting in the fullness of intellectual and spiritual development.
They make this criticism respectfully not to disparage the state
schools but with full awareness of the complex problems which religious pluralism engenders in those circumstances. The religious
neutrality in state schools is not the definition of an educational
ideal but a compromise, an abstention which constitute the very
reason why parents who can afford to do so send their children to
church-affiliated schools.
26

Cochran v Board of Education
Whereas in the Pierce ruling the principal stress was upon the
correlation of real rights, parental rights and the proprietary rights
of private corporations to participate in public education in the
Cochran case the Court upheld the identifiable common purposes of
a total view of pluralist public education as the legitimate objective
of a general welfare benefaction. The appellant had brought suit
to restrain the Louisiana state officials from expending any part
of the severance tax fund in purchasing textbooks and in supplying
them free of cost to parochial school children, contending that
utilization of state funds for private uses controvened the mandate
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support
of this federal judicial question they argued that:
26.
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The courses of study and the school books prescribed by the
private, religious, and other schools aforesaid not embraced
in the public educational system of the State of Louisiana,
are different from those prescribed and used in the free
public schools of this State, and the Louisiana State Board
of Education has no right or authority to prescribe the course
of study or the school books to be used by the children
attending schools constituting no part of the public educational system of the State of Louisiana, and petitioners
show that there is a large number of such private and
sectarian or denominational schools in the State of Louisiana
where religious instruction is included in the course of study,
and many of the school books selected, used and required
in such schools, are designed and employed to aid and promote religious beliefs, and to foster and encourage the prmciples of faith, and to teach the tenets of the creed, mode
of worship, and ecclesiastical policy of the respective
churches under whose respective control the said schools
are conducted. 27 (Italics supplied.)

Further, the petitioners asserted that Section 4 of Article I and
Section 8 of Article IV of the Constitution of Louisiana forbade
"the taking of money from the public treasury for the purpose of
teaching religion, and in aid of churches, sects, or denominations
of religion." The respondents acknowledged all the alleged facts
but contended to the contrary,
That it is not their intention nor purpose to furnish free,
or otherwise, any sectarian or denominational textbooks to
and that
the school children of the State of Louisiana
respondents only propose to furnish such books to the
educable school children of the State attending schools, curricula of which have been approved by the State Board of
Education of Louisiana.28 (Italics supplied.)

The state further expanded upon the comprehensive conception of
all publicly accredited schooling by asserting:
That the private schools of the State of Louisiana thus
become and are agencies of the state, aiding in the education
of its children and making it possible to educate many
thousands who would otherwise be deprived of educational
That the primary policy of the aforesaid
advantages.
acts of the legislature is providing free textbooks for the
educable school children of the State, without discrimination
as to race, sex, religion or creed, and respondents aver
that if any children of the State are denied the privilege of
obtaining free school books from the State of Louisiana because of the fact that such children are attending private
or sectarian schools, such discrimination would be arbitrary,
27.
28.

Record, p. 4, Cochran v. Board of Education, 8upra note 26.
Id. at 13.
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unjust and illegal, as well as unconstitutional, and incapable
of legal enforcement.2 9

(Italics supplied.)

It was the Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, which enlarged
upon the child-benefit concept and related it to state-care for all
educable school children.
One can scan the acts in vain to ascertain where any money
is appropriated for the purchase of school books for the
use of any church, private, sectarian, or even public school.
The appropriations were made for the specific purpose of
purchasing school books for the use of the school children of
the state, free of cost to them. It was for their benefit and the
resulting benefit to the state that the appropriations were
made. True, these children attend some school, public or
private, the latter, sectarian or non-sectarian, and that the
books are to be furmshed to them for their use, free of cost,
whichever they attend. The schools, however, are not the
beneficiaries of these appropriations. They obtain nothing
from them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation, because of them. The school children and the state alone are
the beneficiaries. It is also true that the sectarian schools,
which some of the children attend, instruct their pupils in
religion, and books are used for that purpose, but one may
search diligently the acts, though without result, in an effort
to find anything to the effect that it is the purpose of the
state to furnish religious books for use of such children.
In fact, in view of the prohibitions in the Constitution
against the state's doing anything of that description, it would
be legally impossible to interpret the statute as calling for
any such action on the part of the state... .o (Italics
supplied.)
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes, took cognizance of the nondiscriminatory language
of the state statute which authorized without any religious exclusionary clause "supplying school books to the school children of
the state" and the directive to the Board of Education to provide
"school books for school children free of cost to such children."
After quoting the language of the majority set out above, it concluded:
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus attributed to
it, we cannot doubt that the taxing power of the state is
exerted for a public purpose. The legislation does not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or
attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively private
concern. Its interest is education, broadly; its method, com29. Id. at 16.
30. Borden v. Loulalana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123 So. 655, 660
(1929).
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prehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the common interest is safeguarded. 81
The ruling of the Louisiana state courts stresses the patria
potestas of the state for all its educable children without distinguishing in the reach of its care between the children who attend state
and privately operated schools. They reject the contention of the
plaintiffs that the non-governmental schools are "not embraced in
the public educational system of the State of Louisiana," that these
schools "constitute no part of the public educational system of the
State of Louisiana." On the contrary, they agree with the state
"that the private schools of the State of Louisiana thus become and
are, agencies of the State, aiding m the education of its children."
The reach of the state concernment is for all educable school children without discrimination as to race, sex, religion or creed. The
intent and reach of the legislative benefaction, as the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, stresses, is the benefit of the educable child
and its consequent benefit to the State. "It was for their benefit
and the resulting benefit to the State that the appropriations were
made." The United States took cognizance of the nondiscriminatory
language of the state statute which authorized without any religious
exclusionary norm "supplying school books to the school children
of the state" and the directive to the Board of Education to provide "school books for school children free of cost to such children."
It is the firm persuasion of this writer that any federal aid program
for the betterment of national education ought to confront the
question squarely and affirm or deny whether or not education in
private, religious schools is or is not achieving those objectives of
schooling that are in the interest of general welfare. This fact is
in practice acknowledged by the schools themselves both on the
intracollegiate, collegiate, and university levels. Students may
transfer from one school to another m midterm or after graduation with due acknowledgement of the academic record. Ought
not the law admit what the academy itself has never denied?
Obviously, governmental aid to church-related schools would be
directed and proportionate to 'the public function of these schools,
(namely, the mastery of the secular and natural sciences) and a
formal explicit acknowledgement of the secular goals and achievements of the church-related schools so long acted upon in a multiplicity and diversity of federal aid programs is long overdue.
2
Everson v. Board of Education1
Whereas in Pierce, the Court affirmed the legal right of private
corporations, whether religious, secular, or military, to participate

31.
32.
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in public schooling together with state schools as a necessary correspondent to the inviolable moral right of parents to direct the
education of minors, and in Cochran the Court denied that the
religious profession of parochial schools constituted an exclusionary
norm to forbid state provision of secular education facilities to all
educable school children, in Everson the Court through the majority
opinion of Mr Justice Black, declared in italicized words-as if to
emphasize the firmness of its conviction-that no religious exclusionary rule may be applied to recipients of state welfare benefits.
The Everson ruling is a study of symmetry of dialectic with inbuilt antinomies that can be explained only by subordinating an
absolute premise to a particular determination rather than by relating the specific ruling to the general premise. A taxpayer of
the township of Ewing brought suit against the reimbursement to
parents for the cost of transportation of children to Catholic schools
which were being made pursuant to a resolution of the school board
of Ewing in accordance with a state statute authorizing such provisions. It is not without significance that Mr Justice Black,
speaking for the majority of five, disposed of the argument that
the payments were illegal because they required the taking of some
persons' property for the private use of others, by rejecting the
contention that the religious affiliation of the parochial schools
withdrew them from the area of public education. This he did both
at the beginning of his opinion and at its conclusion.
It is much too late to argue that legislation intended to
facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose.
The same thing is no
less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or all
parents, for the payment of fares of their children so that
they can ride in public busses to and from schools rather
than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to
walking or 'hitchhiking' s3 (Italics supplied.)
And
Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a
general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools.3 4 (Italics supplied.)
Everson, reaffirms Cochran in holding to the public function and
character of the educational process and facilities of private, religious-affiliated schools. It is the core of the ruling composed of
two solemn declarations, one succeeding the other, that has stirred
an almost endless controversy on the permissible and impermissible
tax benefits that are constructively in accord with or in contraven33. Id. at 7.
34.

Id. at 18.
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tion of the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment and
the complete proscription of any religious esclusionary in the application of governmental benefits. In a word, there is an apparent
contrariety between two absolutes which is resolved differently by
two opposing schools of interpretation. The advocates of absolutely
no aid subordinate the second absolute to the first; the advocates
of aid in support of a legislatively defined secular goal, qualify the
first absolute by the second.
We must consider the New Jersey statute in accordance
with the foregoing limitations imposed by the First Amendment. But we must not strike that state statute down if it
is within the state's constitutional power even though it approaches the verge of that power New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support
of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any
church. On the other hand, the other language of the
amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its
citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans,
Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers,
Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because
of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare. While we do not mean to intimate that a
state could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches.
To be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey
from extending its general state law benefits to all citizens
without regard to their religious beliefs.8 5
The italics in the above passage are the Court's (an unusual
occurrence in the Court's opinions) and clearly reject an exclusionary religious test in the definition of general welfare benefits. And
then as if to link together Pierce and Cochran with Everson,
Justice Black adds:
The Court has said that parents may in the discharge of
their duty under state compulsory education laws, send their
children to a religious rather than a public school, if the
school meets the secular education requirements which the
state has power to impose.8 (Italics supplied)
The Court does not deny that some undoubted benefits do accrue
to the parochial schools by the extension of transportation facilities
set by the state, but this does not constitutionally interdict that
neutrality on religious matters which permits the state to direct
35.
36.
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its assistance to a secular purpose that is being realized under
the state's own supervisory educational regulations by religious institutions.
Of course cutting off church schools from these services, so
separate and indisputably marked off from the religious
function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to
operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
nonbelievers. It does not require the state to be their
adversary State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them. 7
Everson like Cochran affirms the principle that government may
assist public service aspects of an educational process which fulfills the secular educational requirements which the state has power
to impose. Indeed, their accreditation depends upon this compliance.
In at least three different instances does the Court acknowledge
the secular education that obtains in religious schools and finds it
almost tiresome to doubt it. "It is much too late to argue that
legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get
a secular education serves no public purpose."
We maintain in this study that an exclusionary rule for government benefactions based on religious profession ought to raise substantive constitutional questions about the legal consequences attendant upon the exercise of religious liberty in education. We cannot too often repeat that the only practical way of interpreting and
executing legislative statutes reaching to a public interest and service without prejudice to religious liberty is the empirical test of
ascertaining whether the secular aspects and functions of nontheological studies, in the promotion of which the government has
a direct interest, are in fact proficiently and competently realized
to the public benefit. Such an empirical device or measurement
can meet the impartial requirement of Justice Black's statement,
"because of faith, or lack of it."
Unfortunately the passage which precedes the one we have been
analyzing is more often quoted because it provides another "absolute"
held in the particular ruling. The Court took cognizance of the
appellant's contention that the provision of transportation at public
expense for children who attend church-affiliated schools constituted
an aid to religion in violation of the no establishment clause of the
First Amendment. Said Mr Justice Black:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
87. Id. at 16.
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Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another Neither can force nor influence a person to
go to or remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of
any religious organizations or groups or vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state." 3
A careful weighing of these propositions discloses that nonestablishment is simply not a disengagement from religious life of
the American community but directed to ensuring the exercise of
religious liberty without any coercive interference touching upon the
individual choice to believe or not believe, to attend religious services or not. Other propositions must be historically viewed as
against those incidences of state-establishment of church or religion,
which by legislative preference for a creed visited civil disabilities
and punitive consequences upon dissidents and nonconformists and
imposed taxes upon them for the support of a faith or church not
of their choice or confession. What has provided the occasion of
much controversy is the implication of the literal statements which
seem to proscribe any aid to religion, even on a nondiscriminatory
basis, "in any amount, large or small, to support any religious
activities or institutions." While the language admittedly lends itself to a formula of absolutely no aid at all to religion a reading
of it in context saddles such an interpretation with many difficulties.
The demarcation of a secular education in church-related schools
to which both Cochran and Everson admit, is held to be constitutionally eligible for government support proportionate to the fulfillment
of the purpose. In such a context, then, an educational process
that is so defined and supportable by tax funds is not constructively
aid for any religious activities or institutions that teach or practice
religion, even if as a consequence there is an overflow of some
benefit to the religious agency itself. One cannot control the consequence of multiple effects in this matter no more than in any
other human enterprise. And the legislative record of state and
federal tax support, large and small, in a variety of forms, with
no prejudice to religious affiliation is a constant witness to this
official conviction. Grants and contracts for research projects,
38.
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scholarships, fellowships, tuition grants, and loans for educational
facilities and building constructions, fiscal provision for remedial and
special pedagogy for the mentally retarded, for disadvantaged children, funds for language institutes and training programs and numerous other programs by a variety of government agencies constitute one of the most gratifying etceterations of government use
of all educational instrumentalities for the sake of general welfare
without any religious exclusionary rule. Where an identity of the
secular goals of education and a compatibility of interest has existed, national and state legislatures have made appropriations in
support of those achievements. This is not to say that the same
identical provisions in kind and degree are extended in every form
of governmental aid in support of the secular goals of education
in state and nonstatal schools. Some, such as scholarships and
tuition grants, fellowships, matching grants, research grants and
contracts, student loans at low interest are generally extended on
equal basis. Government funds for educational equipment and
building construction of science buildings, campus centers, and
dormitories, generally take the form of long-term loans at low interest when extended to church-affiliated schools.
The legislatures of the nation have established a long standing consensus on the competence and effectiveness of the educational
process in nongovernmental schools without prejudice to religious
affiliation. As for the interdiction of any aid to religion impartially
extended, such as tax exemptions and tax deductible benefits to
churches and religious institutions and agencies, the support of
military and legislative chaplains, the income tax laws which permit housing allowances for ministers, exemptions from military
service of conscientious objectors, of students of divinity, and of
clergy in peace and war, whatever the underlying rationale justifying or challenging these preferment benefits of public law, the secular goals and achievements of these institutions of learning which
are accredited and comply with state educational requirements
should not be equally subsumed under the same general discussion.
If the Everson decision indicates any direction of application it
points favorably in the direction of the educational concernment of
governments.
If the two classic passages on non-aid-at all-and the religious
exlusionary rule mean anything it is that the two absolutes must
be jointly considered and related to one another Undoubtedly the
first absolute would deny tax support of sectarian teaching and
practices. The second absolute should deny the exclusion of religious
sectarian agencies and institutions from government aid in the
achievement of secular goals in which the government has a substantive interest to promote. The Court has upheld this federal
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involvement in Bradfield in the area of hospital care in the educational field, the provision of textbooks by the state to all educable
children by the Cochran ruling.
McCollum v Board of Education,9
The McCollum ruling of 1948 struck down the Champaign, Illinois,
religious instruction program which was conducted on the school
premises by outside teachers representing the various faiths to
students whose parents had requested these religious classes. The
Court through the majority opinion of Mr Justice Black, found the
arrangement to be a utilization of tax-supported public school system
and its compulsory attendance machinery for the dissemination of
sectarian religious doctrine that is proscribed by the nonestablishment clause of the First Amendment.
This specific ruling has no bearing on the issue before us. In
fact a comparison of the two considerations would be as a matter
of factual situation and the controlling legal principles would be
more notable for its sharp contrasts than for similarities.
Zorach v

Clauson,40

The impartiality of the Everson ruling which refused to allow
the religious affiliation to be made the basis of an exclusionary rule
seemed to some constitutional jurists to have been reduced to a
questionable neutrality of total abstention in McCollum, was restored
in Zorach with such affirmations as to lead some scholars to hold
that McCollum was to a considerable extent checked by a more
positive construction of government neutrality Zorach permitted
tax-salaried public school officials to cooperate with the religious
released time program conducted off school property. If it is a
cause for some reflection why the absolute separatism passage in
Everson is cited more often without the accompanying absolute
interdiction of a religious exclusionary rule of the succeeding paragraph, it is even more surprising why it is quoted more frequently
than the more positive formula of Zorach, which was a later ruling,
as if the earlier formula were the only one to control church-state
relations in education. Zorach like McCollum does not concern itself
with government funds in support of education in church-related
schools. It does, however, affirm broadly certain propositions on
relations between the government and the religious life of the
American community Mr Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, distinguished Zorach from McCollum on two grounds - there
was no utilization of tax-supported property premises and there
39.
40.
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was no evidence of any coercion being exercised upon the children
by state officials. It does make statements which are intended to
make more clear the absolute prohibition of the non-establishment
clause.
does not say that in every and all
The First Amendment
respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.
Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways,
in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency
one on the other That is the common sense of the matter
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each
other - hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly Churches
could not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire
protection to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into their place of worship would violate the Constitution. Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the
Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamation making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me
God" in our courtroom oaths - these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public
rituals, our ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even object to
the supplication with which the Court opens each session:
41
"God save the United States and this Honorable Court.'"
And then there follows that memorable passage in which neutrality
of total abstention is disowned for a benevolent impartiality that
finds expression in reasonable accommodations. It is not without
profound significance that this passage is introduced with the statement: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being." Here in the solemnity of the highest judicial review
on the constitutionality of official actions and law, the high tribunal
was not simply observing that as a broad, undeniable historical
fact the American people have been traditionally religious, Godfearing and God-loving men. Rather, it said with calculated particularity that the public institutions of the American Republic rested
on religious belief in God.
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom of worship as
one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows
no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedudule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best
41.
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of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature
of our people and accommodates the public service to thewr
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the government show
a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be
preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe. Government may not finance religious groups
nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one
or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to
be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts
to wide the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between
sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not
make a religious observance compulsory It may not coerce
anyone to attend church, to observe religious holiday, or
to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or
suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to
their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction. More
than that is undertaken here.
This program may be unwise and improvident from an educational or a community viewpoint. That appeal is made
to use on a theory previously advanced, that each case must
be decided on the basis of "our own prepossessions."
Our individual preferences, however, are not the constitutional standard. The problem, like many problems in constitu42
tional law, is one of degree.
The Zorach ruling like that of McCollum was not concerned with
the issue of government funds for secular goals in religious education. Zorach is nonetheless significant in its stress upon a principle
of benevolent impartiality as within the permissible governmental
relations with religion that are not forbidden by the nonestablishment clause. Against a neutrality of total abstention the Court sets
a formula of a cooperative and reasonable accommodation that
gives scope to the religious life of the American community without
placing constraints upon anyone, believer or nonbeliever. There is
implied in the specific settlement of the case a point which is
explicitly stressed by Mr Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion
and which carries with it a meaning not openly stated in the majority
ruling. Justice Frankfurter would have no constitutional qualms if
there were a general dismissed time program whereby the public
school once a week dismissed all students an hour earlier than the
general hour of the end of the school day In such an arrangement
the students may then spend that hour as they choose, to sectarian
instruction, to ethical instruction, to the study of music, etc. But
the provision of the New York Legislature for released time within
42.
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the regular school day would seem to imply that a nexus be affirmed
between the educational process and religious and spiritual values
in an arrangement that does no violence to the diversities of
religious conscience.
There is an undoubted difference of attitude and approach
between Zorach and McCollum. It seems to overleap McCollum while
adhering to that specific ruling, - to Everson and repeat in different
language some of its proscriptions of government activity that fall
under the ban of the nonestablishment clause. Government may not
finance religious groups, must be neutral between sects, cannot
undertake religious instruction or force religion, religious instruction, or religious observance on anyone. These proscriptions leave
untouched the support by government of carefully defined secular
goals of education by whomsoever they are realized. The support
of educational programs which are not religious subjects but are
identifiable as citizen education are objectives which can be fulfilled
by competent and official educational agents and facilities. To preclude some of them because of their religious confession or affiliation
is to do violence to the absolute proscription of an exclusionary
rule affirmed so categorically in italics in Everson. At the same
time the absolute proscriptions of the nonestablishment clause does
not preclude a reasonable measure of accommodation for specifically
religious practices and teachings. To what extent public law accommodations for religious teachings and practices are permissible
- such as the New York released time program and the sectarian
religious holidays durng school years - and when they are forbidden will depend on the degree of governmental involvement that
the Court decides m each instance to be within the complementary
boundaries of the two religious clauses of the First Amendment.
Zorach made no mention of the Jeffersoman metaphor, "wall
of separation," which other members of the Court cited in their
several opinions in the earlier Everson and McCollum cases. Rather,
the Court strove sedulously to contrive a formula of separation of
church and state without resorting to the mataphor on masonry and
its connotation of complete and permanent separation. 43 As Mr
Justice Frankfurter was to observe later, the separation is one of
friendly fences between neighbros that allows and encourages cordial
and cooperative relations.

43. Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in the Sunday Law cases, states.
"But the several opinions in Everson and McCollum, and in Zorach V. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, makes sufficiently clear that 'separation' is not a self-defining concept." McGowan v.
Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 461 (1961).
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SUNDAY

CLOSING LAWS CASES

McGowan v

Maryland"

All of the court opinions in this and other Blue Laws cases
admitted the religious origin of the Sunday day of rest. The majority
Court opinion, while aware that some state Blue Laws still literally
refer to the Lord's day, held to the valid secular purpose which
was said to emerge from and to prevail apart from its religious
origins even if it still operated in such a manner as to favor the
dominican and to the disadvantage of the sabbatarian religious
confessions. "The proponents of Sunday closing legislation are no
longer exclusively representatives of religious interest." There is
no denial of the obvious fact, on the part of the court, that there
is an intermingling of interests, of secular objectives and of religious
advantage partial to Christians. But the court opinion refuses to
allow that such concurrence of benefits, secular and religious, nullifies the valid secular purpose which government has a right and
duty to secure:
However, it is equally true that the "Establishment Clause"
does not bar federal or state regulation of conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions. In many instances,
the Congress or state legislatures conclude that the general
welfare of society, wholly apart from
any religious considera45
tions, demands such regulations.
Sunday Closing Laws, like those before us, have become
part and parcel of this great governmental concern wholly
apart from their original purposes or connotations. The
present purpose and effect of most of them is to provide a
uniform day of rest for all citizens; the fact that the day
is Sunday, a day of particular significance for the commant
Christian sects, does not bar the state from achieving its
secular goals. To say that the states cannot prescribe Sunday
as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries
ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare
46
rather than one of mere separation of church and state.
With what force of logic and reason one may reflect in similar
terms upon an analogous situation, the intermingling of secular
functions and religious aspects of church-school education, will depend for the most part on the recognition of a secular goal of
education in the curriculum in which the state has a substantive
interest and which can be ascertained empirically by the state
educational authorities. The precise holding of Chief Justice Warren's
44.
45.
46.
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opinion is that governmental action directed to a valid public purpose
does not become invalid because it operates simultaneously to
other effects - the promotion of religious interests, either generally
or of a particular group. The court opinion holds to its exposition
of nonestablishment by referral to Everson which had upheld the
expenditure of public funds to transport children to parochial schools
as a legitimate service for a valid secular purpose. This secular
purpose was not solely the safe transportaion of the school children
but, as Justice Black noted, a safety means to the secular educational goals which the state requires and accredits in religious
schools. The fulfillment of these secular purposes are not annulled
or vitiated because it also advances and helps a program of religious
education. Mr Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion adds to the
Chief Justice's rationale:
To ask what interest, what objective legislation serves, of
course, is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine
the necessary effects of what they have enacted. If the primary end achieved by a form of regulation is the affirmation or promotion of religious doctrine-primary in the sense
that all secular ends which it purportedly serves are derivative from, not wholly independent of, the advancement of
religion - the regulation is beyond the power of the state.
This was the case in McCollum. Or if a statute furthers
both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the
effectuation of the secular ends alone - where the same
secular ends could equally be attained by means which do
not have consequence for promotion of religion - the statute
cannot stand. A state may not endow a church although
that church might inculcate in its parishioners moral precepts
deemed to make them better citizens, because the very
raison d'etre of a church, as opposed to any other school
of civilly serviceable morals, is the predication of religious
doctrine. However, inasmuch as individuals are free, if they
will, to build their own churches and worship in them, the
State may guard its people's safety by extending fire and
police protection to the churches so built. It was on the
reasoning that parents are also at liberty to send their children to parochial schools which meet the reasonable educational standards of the State, Pierce v Society of Sisters,
258 U.S. 510, that this Court held in the Everson case that
expenditure of public funds to assure that children attending
every kind of school enjoy the relative security of busses,
rather than being left to walk or hitchhike, is not an unconstitutional 'establishment,' even though such an expenditure
may cause some children to go to parochial schools who
would not otherwise have gone. The close decision of the
Court in Everson serves to show what nice questions are
involved in applying to particular governmental action the
proposition, undeniable in the abstract, that not every regulation, some of whose practical effects may facilitate the
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observance of a religion by its adherents,
affronts the re47
quirement of church-state separation.
Mr Justice Frankfurter after repeatedly stressing that in some
activities public and religious interests "overlap," "interplay,"
and that the history of Blue Laws has made them "the vehicle of
mixed and complicated aspirations," inquired as to when a benefit
to religion may be allowable if there is an intermingling of religious
and civic objectives. Only, he concluded, when there is no other
alternative for realizing the secular goals:
Or if the statute furthers both secular and religious ends
to the effectuation of the secular ends alone - where the
same secular end could equally be attained by means
which do not have consequences for promotion of religion
-

the statute cannot stand.

This passage precedes Justice Frankfurter's concatenation of
Pierce, Everson, with the ruling in McGowan and therefore invites
a legitimate argument by analogy with the mixed objectives in
education. It is a misconstruction to frame the problem simply as
- the government cannot financially take over the entire educational
facilities of the country and therefore the only alternative is for
the government to assist to some extent the education of its children
that attend church-sponsored schools. The simple answer to that
would be - that such an alternative is possible. The problem is
correctly formulated in terms of the right of the student (and of
his parents) to attend a schooling of the lower and higher levels
in accordance with the dictates of his conscience. There can be no
feasible alternative to these church-related schools to this compounded right other than for the government to allow the teaching
of religious dogma and philosophy in an all-comprehensive government system of education by tax paid teachers, not excluding the
clergy This supposition would not be seriously contemplated either
as a matter of American policy or of constitutional law
But the economic argument does come into play when related
to the corporate proprietary rights of the church-related schools.
Proponents of federal aid to education on the lower levels have
argued that the exclusion of the parochial schools from sharing in
government aid would place them in such a disadvantageous position
in the face of enormous resources of the federal government that
the educational facilities of the parochial schools might in comparison be reduced to a level of inferiority which could prove harmful
in these schools. Has the government no alternate means of avoiding
this alleged damage to private schools? One might push the question
47.

Id. at 465-67.
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further and ask if it is in the national interest to bring about,
however indirectly, this imbalance? The root question to which we
must always return is to ask of the government what precisely is
the status of parochial schools (apart from their constitutional right
to educate in fulfillment of state educational requirements) in the
comprehensive national educational program: to ask whether in
fact they can and do contribute to the national education of the
country and whether government may rely upon them as well as
upon state-owned schools for its educational programs.
The underlying import of the economic aspect of the Sunday
Law cases is that the state would be obligated to hold in check the
free play of open market competition (even on the claim of religious
conscience) if in effect it would obstruct or frustrate a valid secular
goal. Whether or not the federal government may be economically
unconcerned about the educational facilities of approximately six
million parochial school children and the status of eight hundred
church colleges is a question that ought not to be settled out of
hand without first determining their place in the scheme of the
national interest.
In coming to a decision, the Congress ought first to make this
frank confrontation of the crucial issue. But apart from the vast
economic consideration is the evaluation of the educational process
itself. Permeation means intermingled objectives - value judgments, and motives, and religious and secular aspects of the
science studies. May the national legislature any more than the
courts choose one mode of value-inculcation against the others?
Or, may it allow any value integration which is not offensive to the
communal welfare, perhaps even tributary as a spiritual force, and
which preserved intact the secular aspects and functions of the
educational process that the public interest requires? If the indefectibility of the secular studies is assured - and this, we must
repeat may be ascertained empirically - then government aid
ought not to be interdicted because of a religious consequential.
The exercise of religious liberty should be no less inviolable in
education and no less free of government prejudices and civil disabilities than in any other public endeavors or enterprises.
8
Torcaso v Watkins'

In Torcaso the right of a citizen to become a notary public without being required by law to make a public declaration of belief in
God was upheld. It would have been more felicitous had the court
not subsumed in a footnote, by an exercise of logical positivism,
nontheistic beliefs into the meaning of religion in the First Amend48.

367 U.S. 982 (1963).

634

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW

ment. To have preserved even in legal interpretation the traditional
meaning of religion as the relation of man to a transcendental
being, God, would not have precluded the right of a non-theistic
(nonreligious) conscience from the protective mantle of the First
Amendment religious clauses. Torcaso could have adequately rested its ruling on the Anglo-American tradition of law that the right
to belief is a right to an internal area of absolute inviolability into
which inner sanctum neither the law may inquire nor the coercive
power of government force its disclosures. However, what does
emerge from Torcaso for the purpose of our discussion is that
regardless of the faith or lack of faith (Everson) what matters is
that the public service of a public office (whether correspondent
to the official's conscience or not) be in accord with the requirements
of the duties of that office. If the conscience, religious or not, be
tributary to, or at least conform with the civic virtues of public
office, the law will not inquire further to ask on what theological
grounds such conduct is based. The particulars of Torcaso mark it
off by some distance from questions of federal aid to religiously
integrated education. But it does suggest further reflections on the
public benefit that the government expects and empirically ascertains in an educational process permeated by ultimates whether
theistically grounded or not, whether Christian or not, etc. It also
raises the correlative consideration whether equality of religious
liberty whether theistic or nontheistic should not ensue into an
equality of treatment when confronted by government benefactions.
The Maryland state court in upholding the constitutional requirement
had relied on the common law attitude towards atheists as a reasonable basis for excluding the appellant from the office of notary
public. The state court determined that the distinction between believers and nonbelievers as a security for good conduct in office
had not become so devoid of meaning that to adopt it would be
arbitrary The common law statute equated the ungodly with the
unworthy It was supposed, as Professor Wigmore had suggested,
that the sanction of divine retribution for false swearing might
add stimulus to truthfulness wherever that was possible. While
it may be cynical to suggest that many good men are not deterred
from perjury because of moral dictates, it seems equally unreasonable to restrict an inducement to veracity to the believer. The
equation of honesty with belief must in our day give way to the
more conclusive evidence of the actual performance of civic duties.
A line of reasoning on the permeation issue might be constructed
from Torcaso in this fashion. Whether the agent of a public requirement is motivated by theistic or nontheistic belief, whether he invests his work with moral or theological virtue, the service rendered
must be judged on its own merits and by the canons properly
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applicable to that specific performance. Similarly, one may reason,
whatever the spiritual permeation of an educational process - secular humanism, ethical culture, military discipline, theism, Christianity - the educational objectives in which the state has a public
interest must be measured and evaluated by tests proper to the
various intellectual disciplines. Has a student learned to spell, read
multiply ' Does he learn in biology and history what the state
educational authorities require of every schooling? In this wise the
religious permeation of an accredited schooling would not disqualify
from participation in governmental programs for the improvement
of education.
When the Court said in Watson v Jones4 9 "The law knows no
heresy, is committed to the establishment of no religion, the support
of no dogma," it did not mean to say the public law is indifferent
to heresy or dogma. The First Amendment embraces two concepts,
"freedom to believe and freedom to act." (Cantwell v Connecticut)5"
".
In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as
not in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
liberty " Since from the very nature of things not every public
service and benefit is impervious to spiritual and religious values,
public law must direct itself to the realization of its own interest
whether its objectives and motives are intertwined with the objectives and motives of private interest, whether a private agency is
religiously inspired or not. The public good is definable in itself and
its efficacy for the public interest is not impaired - perhaps, on the
contrary, enhanced - for being invested with religious insights.
On this basis, a good start can be made for the substantive construction of a principle of neutrality, with prejudice to the rights
of conscience of no one. Public law has indeed very much interest
m the outward behavior of religious beliefs. It does not disdain to
call upon the religious faiths for support of its own secular programs m time of peace and war. It has an interest m the ulterior
motivation that religious life can provide for the conduct that is
conducive to the harmonious peace and tranquil order of the commonwealth. In the crucial hour for the advancement of civil rights,
public law looks to religious authorities and creeds to enlighten
their faithful and help draw them out of those hardened and blind
social prejudices which obstruct the free exercise of civil liberties
and bring discord and violence to fellow citizens. If public law may
turn to religious life for support of its own civic programs and for
a resolution of many of its complex problems, then it ought not look
askance upon an educational process which the state has accredited
because it fuses the spiritual life of the students with his learning.
49.
Go.
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We cannot departmentalize man by requirements of law and then
ask him to conjoin - supposedly - his dual, concurrent lives as
citizen and believer when the national benefit requires it. In a
word, the law and government are not neutral and indifferent to the
ethical values and religious motivations provided in an accredited
schooling.
Admittedly, there are substantial points of disparity between
Torcaso and the constitutional question of government aid to education. In the disbursement of public benefactions a sound public
policy may justifiably restrict its subsidies to a limited reach. Because privately owned services in industry and commerce - such
as agriculture, airlines and railroad - may require government
subsidies to sustain the public service it does not follow that every
other privately owned and operated public service must be equally
a recipient of government subventions. The controlling consideration
is the substantive national interest. And so we return to the original
question which keeps recurring - whether or not religious institutions of learning are not truly educational facilities and as such
are part of national education, whether these schools should share
in federal programs for the advancement and improvement of their
educational process because they are part of the national interest.
Only in this wise will the twin clauses of the First Amendment
operate to promote the freedom of the believer and the freedom of
the unbeliever in the performance of a public service. To the
absolutist school of interpretation, we suggest that adherence to
the supposed principle that Government cannot aid religion may
well discriminate against religion and impair its free exercise.
School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v

Schempps'

In the light of the court ruling in Engel v Vitale 52 holding unconstitutional a school board's action in prescribing the daily recitation of the New York Regents' non-sectarian prayer, the findings
of the Court in Schempp, concerning the laws and regulations
requiring Bible reading without comment and the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer at the beginning of the public school day, were almost
a certainty to predict.
If a nondenominational prayer could be struck down as a violation
of the nonestablishment clause, the use of the Lord's prayer, as
taught by the Founder of Christianity, would be more vulnerable
to the charge of unconstitutionality Bible reading posed a new
question. While the court followed the finding of the trial court of
a Bible reading without comment at the beginning of the school
day was a religious exercise in itself and in fact was so intended
51.

374 U.S. 203 (1963).

52.

370 U.S. 421 (1962).

LAW AND EDUCATION

637

by the state, it admitted that the Bible could be a legitimate study
and a legitimate object of study for its literary and historic qualities
appropriate to the secular and civic purposes of public schools.
Just as many have considered Zorach a judicial reaction to the
absolutists strictures of McCollum in response to the public furor
that the latter aroused, so too many have felt that both the tone
and attitude of Schempp, while negative m its specific settlement,
showed great concern for the adverse public criticism that followed
upon the Engel decision. Mr Justice Clark's majority opinion repeats Mr Justice Douglas' proposition in Zorach that "we are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
He underscores gratefully the profound significance of religious life
in the American community and in evidence details a number of
public religious exercises. The seventy-nine page concurring opinion
of Mr Justice Brennan discourses about the related meanings of
the religious clauses of the First Amendment, the caution in the
use of historical referrals, the contemporary problematics of religious pluralism, the particularities of public schooling, the constitutional principles m appraising the historic practices of Bible
reading and prayer, and, significantly, six different categories of
permissible cooperation or accommodation between government
and religion. The tone of Schempp is not characterized by the peremptoriness of Engel. Both the majority opinion and the concurring
opinion of Mr Justice Brennan are sensitive to the public concern
on the interrelationship between government and religion by reassuring that some of the traditional government practices in favor
of religion are not being imperiled by the instant decision.
But Schempp differs from Engel in a more significant way than
in its tone of concern and reassurance. The Court could have
settled the issue in Schempp on a narrow meaning of the establishment clause in that the Lord's prayer favored Christians and Bible
reading favored believing Jews and Christians. Instead it struck
down these sectarian religious practices on the broad interpretation
first defined in Everson, and then applied in McCollum, and relied
on in Engels. Government support of any sort of religious activity
in public schools is constructively an establishment of religion.
The element of coercion which was stressed m some of the
opinions in McCollum and was apparently abandoned as a controlling
factor in Engel, has now been succeeded by a consideration of the
degree of governmental involvement even in an arrangement that
rests upon voluntary participation. Mr Justice Douglas noted in
Zorach that the "problem, like many problems in constitutional law,
is one of degree," a consideration which underlay the permissibility
of indirect aid to a religious school in Everson. In McCollum and
Engel, the governmental involvement was found to be equal to
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establishment of religion. What emerges from Schempp is a resolution to the problem of weighing the neutrality principle that has
been repeatedly reaffirmed since Everson by the degree of government involvement and this solution is made to derive from a newly
formulated principle that distinguishes between primary and secondary purposes and effects of legislative enactment. The rationale
upon which McGowan was based is now explicitly translated to the
area of education in Schempp.
The neutrality principle as formulated in these more precise
terms is set forth by Mr Justice Clark as follows:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by
the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 53
Mr Justice Clark prefaces this passage with the notice that in
order to avert a collusion of government and religious functions or
a dependency of one upon the other, it is necessary to apply "the
wholesome neutrality" of preceding cases.
The neutrality which was expressed in absolutist terms - no
aid in any amount or form - which was related to Everson to a
rejection of a religious exclusionary norm - and reaffirmed in
Zorach in terms of impartiality between believer and nonbeliever
and benevolent accommodations, is now spoken of as a "wholesome
neutrality " Further, the Court's opinion begins with a recital of
governmental practices that undoubtedly favor religious life whose
constitutionality the Court does not call into question but which at
the same time seems literally to be at variance with the proposition
that the legislative provision neither advances nor inhibits religion.
How then may this apparent ambivalence be resolved if we are
to spare the court opinion from the charge of inconsistency The
Court speaks of "the primary effect" and of "a primary effect." It
is one thing to say that the primary effect of a legislative enactment
is secular and therefore constitutionally correct even if there are
incidents of benefit to religion and another to speak of "a primary
effect" that is secular but which does not preclude a concomitant
primary effect which advances or inhibits religion. In view of the
specific ruling of Schempp the second interpretation seems unwarranted. The appellants had contended that while Bible reading and
the recitation of the Lord's prayer were religious in purpose and
53.
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effect a no less principal purpose and effect was the promotion of
moral values designed to serve appropriate secular purposes. The
Court rejected this contention and besides it was vulnerable for
other reasons, namely, both religious exercises were patently sectarian in nature. It is more correct to say that the secular primary
purpose must be effectuated by a secular means. The legislation's
validity cannot be impugned even if there follows from its provisions
an incidental consequence which either advances or inhibits religion. At its core this rationale seems to be the identical one upon
which both McGowan and Schempp are based. But following upon
this secular primary purpose and effect - secular means formula,
Mr Justice Clark takes cognizance of practices which are undoubtedly religious and both as means employed and effect intended
obviously advance religion. If the wholesomeness of neutrality
being fashioned by the Court covers under its constitutional mantle
all these instances with no evident sense of embarrassment and
inconsistence, tt would be better counsel to speak of the principle
of neutrality in terms of specific determination rather than in an
all comprehensive doctrinaire construct to be imposed a priori on
conflicting claims. It may be, however, that there is really less
incongruity in the position of the Court than appears at first and
far more basic consistency The key to the solution of these
apparent ambivalences may be found in Zorach where Mr Justice
Douglas observed that the problem is one of degree. A circumstantial
fact which seems to have favored the absolutist interpretation has
been that in recent years these problems have been raised under
the establishment clause of the First Amendment which provided
the occasion for firm and absolute affirmations against any governmental action that at least constructively added up to establishment. The earlier cases, on the contrary, were based on claims
of religious liberty and in these the Court manifested no less zeal
in affirming - a great latitude of freedom against a competing
interest. If then we conjoin the Court's specific rulings and general
propositions in favor of religious liberty of the earlier cases
with those against the establishment cases, in the later cases, there
does emerge a viable formula that guards with equal zeal and firm
conviction the twin religion clauses of the First Amendment. What
at first appeared as inconsistencies in the rationale and specific
determinations of the Court were actually a diversity of positions
concentrating on the protection of rights and against the dangers
of establishment. The Court has upheld exemption from military
service on religious and nontheistic claims of conscience in the
Selective Draft and Seeger cases. In the Jehovah's Witnesses cases,
the Court upheld a latitude in religious proselytizing that protected
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it against the requirements of permits (Marsh v Alabama," 1946;
Kunz v New York, 5 1951), against the claims of privacy and convenience of house owners (Martin v Struthers," 1943), prohibited
the imposition of a tax on the distribution of religious literature
57
(Murdock v Pennsylvania,
1943), and upheld proselytizing on public streets against claims based on common law and state statutory
safeguards for the peace (Cantwell v Connecticut," 1940), and has
repeatedly declined to review lower court approval of the constitutionality of tax exemptions for religion.
The concept of neutrality must then comprehend within itself
not only the strictures against establishment but also the affirmations in vindication of the right of religious liberty While in some
instances these judicial determinations are made independently
under one or other of the two religion clauses at other times they
overlap and still at others they have competed with one another
In these latter instances, the Court has more often than not deferred
in favor of free exercise. In conjoining then the judicial determinations on claims of conscience, religious proselytizing, and tax preferment benefits under the free exercise clause to the rulings under
the establishment prohibition, the neutrality which the Court has
fashioned is more nearly benevolent and accommodating than one
of total and absolute abstention.
But the principle of accommodation like that of neutrality is
also one of degree. The Court has distinguished between three sorts
of accommodation: the required, the permissive and the prohibitive.
We have detailed instances of each sort. Even when the Court is
engaged in weighing competing interest under the religious clauses
the subordination of the establishment interdicts to the free exercises of religion is also a matter of degree beyond which the prohibition falls absolutely The accommodation of public services to
the spiritual needs of a community is an exercise of legislative
discretionary judgement which then in turn is regulated by a pragmatic decision of the Court in each instance. To fix upon the concept
of neutrality divorced from specific Court rulings as a self-operating concept is to ignore the fact that members of the court have
agreed to the same literal formula of neutrality and differed five
to four m the same case or in succeeding cases. Mr Justice Brennan
senses this division within the Court when in Schempp he lists
practices of necessary and allowable accommodations by the government for religion in the very act of ruling against the state law
requirement of Bible reading and the Lord's prayer in public
54.
55.
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schools.5 9 The degree of accommodation under the free exercise
clause must stop short of the strictures of establishment and the
prohibitions of the establishment clause must not in effect become hostile to the rights of religious liberty
The accommodation theory is a slide rule which is guided by
a pragmatic calculation of the degree of government involvement.
In Zorach the professed neutrality is sensitive to a sort of neutrality which may border on hostility to religion. This sensibility reappears in Schempp in the court opinion of Mr Justice Clark and
m the concurring opinion of Mr Justice Brennan. These advisory
cautions on the neutrality concept are more sharply edged in Mr
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion when he states that true neutrality between believer and nonbeliever should rather find its expression m the freedom of choice to participate in religious exercises or not. Their complete exclusion by state authority would
amount to "establishment of a religion of secularism, or at least,
as government support of the beliefs of those who think that
religious exercises should be conducted entirely in private."60 The
judicial insistence on the secular objects of a public schooling however is not to operate to the promotion of secularism. Mr Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion is all the more meaningful when projected against Torcaso which adumbrated nontheistic convictions
together with theistic beliefs and morally grounded values and according brought both not only under the protective mantle of the
free exercise of religion but also submitted each equally to the
strictures of nonestablishment.
Even Schempp reveals that a strongly influential determinant
of the decision was the degree of official involvement in the religious
exercises. The specifics of the state arrangements were considered
to exceed accommodation. 61 Schempp is more nearly in line with
McCollum which seemed to involve the government in religious
teaching to a greater degree than was ruled permissible in Zorach.
If neutrality is hedged in by considerations of accommodation, ac59. These are as follows: (1) cases of conflicts between establishment and free exercise, including provision for churches and chaplains at military establislhments for those
in armed services and chaplains in penal institutions, (2) prayers in legislative chambers and appointment of legislative chaplains; (3) non-devotional use of the Bible in public schools, (4) uniform tax exemptions incidentally available to religious institutions
(5) religious consideration in public welfare programs; (6) activities, like Sunday closing laws, which, though religious in origin, have ceased to have religious meaning. 374
U.S. 203, 294-304 (1963).
60. Id. at 246. So also Mr. Justice Goldberg who wrote that "untutored devotion to
the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results which partake
of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular as a passive or even active, hostility
to the religious." Id. at 306. Such results "are not only not compelled by the constitutio,
but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it." Id. at 306.
61. Mr. Justice Goldberg, observed that the "pervasive religiosity and direct governmental involvement entering in the prescription of prayer and Bible-reading in the public
schools, during and as part of the curricular day, involving young impressionable children
whose school attendance is statutorily compelled and utilizing the prestige, power and
influence of school administration, staff and authority, cannot realistically be termed
simply accommodation.
" 874 U.S. 203, 307 (1963).
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commodation in turn is hedged in by a permissible and nonpermissible degree of governmental involvement. So considered, neutrality
serves as a balancing instrument between the two religious clauses
of the First Amendment which in the concrete means a weighing
of competing interests toward a reasonable pragmatic determination. The absolute formula of no aid actually works to undermine
strict neutrality Aid may be given provided it does not involve the
government itself to a questionable degree in religious teaching and
practices. Schempp provides a formula that is relevant to governmental relations to religious education on two grounds. The legislative power may not be exercised either to advance or inhibit
religion. If this be neutrality it is better designated as a benevolent neutrality rather than a neutrality of abstention. If the government has defined certain specific educational goals whose primary
purpose and effect are secular, then a "wholesome neutrality" precludes it from ruling out of its reach these same objectives as
they are to be found in accredited religious schooling. The question
then of the degree of governmental involvement in religious teaching and practices should not logically rise at all in the state's
promotion and advancement of secular goals of education which
are pursued in church-related schools. Indeed, even the concept of
accommodation does not strictly enter into this primary consideration. Government may spend public money for public purposes
whether in the area of social welfare, health, or education as these
purposes are fulfilled by the severalty of instrumentalities, without
excluding any of them on religious grounds, or because of their
religious affiliation. To do so is to contravene that neutrality and
impartiality repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court.
62
Sherbert v Werner

Sherbert v Werner which was decided on the same day as
Schempp gives strength of confirmation to our reflections.
Adell Sherbert, an adherent of the Seventh-day Adventist Church,
was denied unemployment compensation under the terms of a
South Carolina statute because she would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath day of her faith. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act denied unemployment benefits to persons who would
not accept employment that required work on Saturdays unless it
be for a good cause. The statute did not specify adjectivally what
would be considered a good cause. On its face, the statute did not
require work on Saturday The claim of religious conscientious objection on the part of the Sabbatarian was considered by the Employment Security Commission as an insufficient personal reason62.
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without any referral to the religious category While in intent and
formulation the statute was strictly neutral in its construction, it
operated in practice to favor those who were opposed to work on
Sunday on religious grounds. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the rulings of the South Carolina courts and held that the
religious convictions of the appellant respecting a day of worship
must be considered by the state in deciding whether unemployment
compensation benefits should not be granted to the applicant. The
opinion of the court and of concurring justices reinforces the suggestion that the neutrality of Schempp was greatly influenced by
the degree of actual governmental involvement in religious exercises. In Sherbert, the deference to the free exercise of religion
clause did not entail such intimate involvement and posed no real
danger of establishment. While Sherbert calls to mind the preferred
position given to religious conscience and activities in the Jehovah's
Witness cases, and in the Selective Draft Law cases, Sherbert implies a greater latitude than these other cases. In the holding for
exemptions from regulatory and tax laws, the Court was relieving
religious proselytizing in those cases from a direct burden in the
public conduct of the religious apostolate. In Sherbert, the state
statute, wholly neutral and nondiscriminatory in its terms, was at
most operating an indirect burden on the individual Sabbatarian and
the Court ruled nonetheless that the state defer to her precisely
on religious grounds. We cannot too strongly underscore the significance of Sherbert. The Court ruled that in the applicatiori of an
authentic neutral statute, the state must in its application take into
consideration the religious claim of the appellant and give it a
preferred position as against the indirect burden that the statute
placed on religious liberty Mr Justice Stewart who wrote a concurrmg opinion, and Mr Justice Harlan and Mr Justice White who
dissented, thought that Sherbert was not distinguishable from Braunfield and in effect overruled it. But the Court opinion and the
concurring opinions were convinced that the Sunday Closing Laws
which Braunfield upheld operated a much less direct burden on the
free exercise of religion rights and, besides, the greater dimensions
of public welfare together with the complex difficulties of granting
exemptions to a uniform day of rest posed problems of application
not consequent to the exemption here granted to the Sabbatarian.
When we consider Sherbert's insistence upon the religious factor in the application of a state unemployment compensation act
together with the various acknowledgements of the practical interrelationships between government and religion and its admonitions
against a neutrality that may be hostile to the freedom of religious
life in Schempp decided on the same day, it does not offend reason to say that the Court is far from committed to a strict neu-
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trality concept as some of opponents of government aid to religion
have argued. Mr Justice Brennan's court opinion would not allow
that special preference or exemption on religious grounds was constitutive of establishment.
plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of
the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for
the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in
common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more
than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face
of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the
object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.
Nor
does the recognition of the appellant's right to unemployment benefits under the state statute
serve to abridge any
6 3
other person's religious liberties.
Mr. Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Schempp, could not
resist admonishing his brethren on the Bench against the "mechanistic concept of the Establishment Clause" which he declares to be
offensive both to history and to law and warns of its dangers to
the harmony of the twin religious clauses.
For so long as the resounding but fallacious fundamentalist
rhetoric of some of our Establishment Clause opinions remains on our books, to be disregarded at will as in the
present case, or to be undiscriminatingly invoked as m the
Schempp case
., so long will the possibility of consistent
and perceptive decision in this most difficult and delicate
area of constitutional law be impeded and impaired. 4
The neutrality principle on which Engel and Schempp were
based is to be related to the appropriate degree of abstention which
should keep governmental relations with religion from being too
intimately involved, so that it becomes itself, as it were, an agency
of religious practice and teaching. Sherbert raises for our consideration the question whether or not government may deny on the
basis of religious exclusionary rule financial aid proportionate to
secular goals of education which are no less the objectives of
church-affiliated schools as they are of other private and governmental schools. Sherbert may offer prospects of encouragement for
an affirmative answer since it required the state to consider the
religious factor even though in its application the statute operated
no more than an indirect burden on the free exercise right as
63. Id. at 409.
64. Id. at 416-417. Even Mr. Justice Harlan, who dissented would see no constitutional objection under the establishment clause if the state statute had provided for accominodations to religtous claims. Tue coitqtitutionai concept of neutrality would not have
suffered thereby.
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contrasted with the preferred position for religious activities vindicated for the Jehovah's Witnesses who suffered a direct burden
by state regulatory and taxing requirements.
On March 11, 1965, Judge 0. Bowie Duckett, Associate Judge
of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, gave his decision in The Horace Mann
League of the United States of America, Inc., et al v J Millard
Tawes, Governor et al. upholding the validity and constitutionality
of the Maryland grants to be matched by four church-connected
colleges. 65 The crux in the Court opinion was the extent of the
church relationship, whether one or more of these four institutions
is legally sectarian as contrasted to secular In ascertaining the
measure of the extent of this relationship the opinion briefly summed
up the relevant data.
Hood College is controlled by a Board of 30 Trustees of whom
seven are selected by the United Church of Christ with which the
college is affiliated. With the exception of the chaplain there is
no requirement that any of its administrative officers or faculty
members be of the same religious confession. In an enrollment
of 676, the students are widely distributed among a variety of
faiths. No courses are required as training for the ministry Two
semester courses are mandatory in biblical studies. Hood "makes
some attempt to require its students to attend approximately 14
Wednesday evening services in the Chapel and seven Sunday evening
services also in the Chapel per semester" Hood receives approximately $45,000 annually from the United Church of Christ for operational services and a number of government grants from the
National Science Foundation, the Atomic Energy Commission and
other public agencies.
Western Maryland College is associated with the Methodist
Church. There is no religious test for the admission of any student, teacher or officials. One more than one-third of 40 Trustees
are required to be Methodist ministers. No courses are given
specifically for training in the ministry Studies in biblical literature are mandatory and a certain percentage of chapel services
must be attended. The Methodist Church annually contributes
$40,000 toward the operational costs of the college. All its Presidents have been Methodists. In a faculty of 76, 64 are Protestant,
five Catholic, one Jewish, one Mohammed and five unaffiliated. In
a student enrollment of 755, there is a distribution of religious con65. Chap. 546, Acts of 1963 granted $500,000 to West Maryland College toward the
construction of a science wing and dining hall. Chap. 545, Acts of 1963 granted to St.
Joseph's College $750,000 toward the construction of a science building. Chap. 88, Acts of
1962 granted $500,000 to Hood College toward the construction of a dormitory and classroom building. Chap. 66, Acts of 1962 granted $750,000 to the College of Notre Dame of
Maryland toward the construction of a science building. Each act provided that the
recipient would privately obtain elsewhere an equal and matching sum for the aforesaid
buildings.
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fession. Children of Methodist Ministers receive a 50 per cent reduction in tuition. Students must attend at least five of 10 required
chapel services and studies in biblical literature is mandatory
The College of Notre Dame of Maryland was originally organized
by the School Sisters of Notre Dame, a religious community of
the Roman Catholic Church. Of the seven on the Board of Directors, five are required to be Sisters of Notre Dame. No religious
affiliation is required for the admission of students but approximately 98 per cent of them are Roman Catholic. Of a faculty of
85, 44 are members of religious orders and of the 41 lay teachers
eight are Non-Catholic. They are required courses in philosophy
and theology
St. Joseph's College was founded by Mother Seton in 1809. In
1902 the College was empowered by the State of Maryland to confer degrees for liberal arts and sciences and nursing. While the
Board of Trustees may include two laymen, it is customarily composed of the Sisters. Of the 13 administrative officers all are
Catholic, 10 of them religious and three lay Thirty-seven of the
72 teachers belong to religious orders and of the 35 lay teachers
eight are non-Catholic. Over 98 per cent of the students are Catholic.
Non-Catholics are not required to attend religious courses nor religious services.
Mr Justice Bowie ruled that the Horace-Mann League has no
standing to sue because as a non-profit corporation it pays no taxes
and does not suffer any other injured interest. 66 However, he found
that individual taxpayers who have brought suit not only in their
own name but also on behalf of all other taxpayers of the State
do have sufficient standing to sue. The Plaintiffs in question are
real and personal property taxpayers and therefore have a special
interest in the appropriations, different from that of the general
public and even from other classes of taxpayers. To this must be
added the acknowledgement that the question at issue is of such
importance and urgency that it is ripe for decision.
On the "subordinate question" does the Maryland Constitution
forbid grants of public money to church connected institutions,
Justice Bowie relied on the repeated decisions of the Court of Appeals, Maryland's highest court, that little or no distinction intervenes between a sectarian or secular institution receiving an appropriation, provided the money is used to perform a public service as, for example, health, education, and general welfare of the
67
citizens of the state.
66. Besides, Justice Bowie felt bound to abide by the ruling of Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud,
162 Md. 419, 159 A. 132 (1932), which the Maryland Court of Appeals, its highest court,
had only the year before cited with acceptance. Citizens Committee v. County Comm., 233
Md. 398 (1964).
67. Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides, in part.
nor
ought any person be compelled to
maintain, or contribute
to maintain any place
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Addressing himself to the main question, does the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit these grants to church
connected colleges, Justice Bowie applies Mr Justice Clark's test
in Schempp-a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion. As to the legislative purpose, he observes that the Maryland legislature 8 was in no way
concerned with religion in making the appropriation because the
language of the Acts themselves show that the grants were intended
for science buildings, dormitories, dining halls, and classroom
buildings, all of a secular nature. To the more difficult question,
is the primary effect of one or more of the enactments to advance
religion, he notes that the appropriations are for the construction
of secular college buildings in no way connected with religion, that
there is no training for the ministry at any of these four colleges,
that there is no religious test for faculty members nor for the
admission of students. Noting that there are some requirements
for the study of religion and attendance at religious services for
students of the same religious confession as the college and a
greater distribution of religious professions at Hood and Western
Maryland than at the two Catholic colleges, he said that if an
adult chooses an institution where religious instruction is mandatory,
he is merely asserting his constitutional right to the freedom of
religion.
Justice Bowie takes cognizance of five factors 69 advanced by
the complainants and admits that they do take the measure of the
extent of the relationship of the institutions of learning with religion.
But this, he points out is a foregone conclusion since, to begin
with, the litigation is about church connected colleges. The "real
issue" he emphasizes, is whether the primary effect of providing
the means for the construction of secular buildings at these institutions advances religion. He concludes that the stated purpose
of worship, of any ministry-

"

Justice Bowie quotes the Court of Appeals in

St. 'Mary's

Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 310, 336 "The fact that the institution may be under
denominational or religious control, can in no manner affect their qualification for assuming such relation to the City, or for the full and faithful discharge of the duties that
they may contract to perform. Charity, to say the least of the matter, is quite as likely
to be fully and faithfully administered under such auspices as it could be under any other.
It could, therefore, be no objection that the institutions are or may be under the control
and influence of those belonging to any particular church or denomination." Cf Finan v.
M. & 0.0. of Cumberland. 154 Md. 563, 141 A. 269 (1928), In which the Court of Appeals
upheld the validity of a municipal appropriation in aid of the construction of a hospital
operated by a group of Roman Catholic Nuns. See also, Board of Education v Wheat, 174
Md. 314, 199 A. 628 (1934).

68. Justice Bowie also noted that the Maryland legislature for the past 175 years has
made similar grants to private colleges and universities including miny denominational
institutions. In
holding fast to the concept of neutrality first formulated in Everson,
Justice Bowie notes by citing a long litany of federal governmental programs that this
neutrality has not been an absolute neutrality but one which has be.n as sensitive against

taking a hostile stance against religion as it has against indifference to the establishment
clause.
69.
(1)
stated purpose of the college,
(2)
college personnel
(5)
college's relation
to religious organization,
(4)
place of religion in the college prograUm
(5) the result

and outcome of the college program.
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and formal pronouncements in the college catalogues, especially of
the two Catholic colleges, which declare the centrality of theology
and philosophy in their educational process does not annul the actual
achievements of these institutions in the secular studies for nonCatholic as well as for Catholic students.
The buildings sought to be constructed are for secular
purposes and the testimony in this case clearly establishes
that the secular courses, such as science, English and
mathematics, taught in these Institutions are practically
identical with the courses at non-religious colleges.
non-Catholic students and faculty are freely admitted
to both institutions, and no attempt is made to convert nonCatholic students and faculty or to interfere with the free
exercise of their religion. If we distinguish between church
related colleges on the basis of the degree of their relationship to a particular denomination, we would discriminate
between different religions which is likewise prohibited by
the First Amendment. (Italics supplied)
Justice Bowie concluded by identifying the providential motive behind the secular legislative purpose and primary effect of the enactment.
Most of us know that the Government maintains Military,
Naval and Air Academies, but that it lacks a science academy All of our scientists, therefore, must come from the
public and private institutions of higher learning. According
to the testimony of this case there are a total of approximately 1189 private institutions of higher learning in the United
States and of this total, 817 are church related. Our source
for obtaining scientists would be very limited if confined to
the small number of non-religious institutions.
It would
therefore seem to me that the scientific education of college
students is most vital to our public safety and welfare,
perhaps more so than training juveniles at St. Mary's Industrial School even though it did produce Babe Ruth.70
Justice Bowie upheld the state of Maryland's appropriations as
valid and constitutional.
There are a number of reflections I wish to note on Justice
Bowie's ruling. In determining the constitutionality of financial assistance to church-affiliated schools we must identify the "real
issue." The direct purpose to which these appropriations are applied
must be such as are within the rights and duties of the legislative
power to provide for-security of state, general welfare, etc. The
fulfillment of these purposes are not vitiated, deflected, or renderd
70. The Plaintiffs conceded that public grants to religious institutions, such as hospitals,
orphan asylums and other non-educational institutions are valid when affecting health,
safety and welfare of our citizens.
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less acceptable to state authority because they are realized through
agencies that are motivated by religious convictions. Nor are they
less competently taught nor less efficient in the end result because
of the philosophy of education which correlates all the various
disciplines of learning to a religious source. The actual achievement can be empirically ascertained. The degree then of involvement of religious persons in the governance of the educational institution is not relevant to the constitutional determination no more
than its avowed philosophy of education. The real issue is whether
the legislative secular purpose and primary effect is fulfilled. The
primary effect of providing the means for the construction of secular buildings at these institutions is not to advance religion. Unquestionably, such an assistance for secular goals in a churchrelated college is an advantage to the educational institution but
only because its students are obtaining at these institutions these
secular studies that they would otherwise have to seek elsewhere.
Whoever raises the question that such aid "advances religion" as
a legitimate consideration must also raise the correlative question
whether its denial because of the institution's religious affiliation
does not constitute an inhibition of religion. In all court rulings
the phrase "neither advances" is always coupled with "nor inhibits
religion." Only in such wise can we strive for that "wholesome
neutrality" that Justice Clark wrote of in Schempp and for the
impartiality-"because of faith or lack of faith"-which Justice
Black set down in Everson.
It is high time that there be openly admitted on all sides that
the educational process is preeminently a spiritual process and that
the law does not prescribe what that spiritual integration betheistic, non-theistic, Catholic, Christian, Hebraic, Ethical-Culture,
etc. The real issue is whether the philosophy of education professed
in any way diminishes the content and methodology of the secular
subjects taught at these church-connected institutions. We have already pointed to a very broad and highly significant fact that the
academy itself does not discriminate between the state, private,
and religious schools in their mutual acceptance of students and
graduates. If law be concerned with the realities of national education, how then may the law not admit the same evidences of
academic achievement?
Church-related colleges are essentially educational institutions,
not religious enterprises, and they can contribute to the state's interest in educational accomplishment. The religious piety which
these religious colleges may actively foster by their environment,
courses in theology, and attendance at chapel services is never
considered by them as a substitute for competence in learning.
Those who fail their examinations are not the less pious and those
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who do pass are not necessarily numbered among the saints. The
avowed aims that appear in their college catalogues to integrate
the collection of the various disciplines of learning into an integrated
whole is ostensibly to invest the whole educational process with
moral values and religious motivations for the benefit of the student and of the community in which he will live. This religious
investiture is intended to keep science and its achievements preeminently humxn, that is, subject to moral judgment and evaluation, to couple freedom with responsibility, and to ordain through
human effort the stark realism of arbitrary human conduct to the
ideals that elevate by faith, hope and charity It is surely not an
unwarranted usurpation much less a legal prohibition that educators
teach the meaning of life and the destiny of man as a salutary
accompaniment to immediate secular pursuits. It is the answer to
Tertullian's question "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"
The church affiliated schools enjoy the singular advantage of
providing instruction on the relations between man and God, the
want of which constituted for Jefferson a "chasm in a general institution of the useful sciences." It is for this reason that Jefferson
in his education plans for the state of Virginia entrusted this responsibility "to each society of instruction in its own doctrine" and
extended facilities to them on the grounds of the state university
or adjacent to it.71 It is facile but misleading construction to trans-

late the constitutional neutrality between believer and nonbeliever
into a neutral educational process. The first is a legal act; the
second is a myth. If the educational process is to be adumbrated
within constitutional neutrality, then the correct formula is that the
constitution is neutral on value judgments that invest all educational
processes with the reasonable and necessary reservation that the
general welfare is not harmed thereby Indeed, it will be found
that there are a diversity of value-judgment systems that are contributory to the commonwealth.
The plaintiffs appealed the ruling of the lower court and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland72 by a 4 to 3 vote reversed in part
by upholding the constitutionality of the matching grants for Hood
but denying them to the other three colleges. The ruling of the
court revolved on the contention of the appellants that while some
degree of relationship to church or religion may exist in an educational institution without rendering it "sectarian," a relationship
which is "substantial" renders the institution sectarian and thereby
constitutionally ineligible to receive public funds. The appellees, on
the contrary, held that the degree of relationship to religion, how71.

COSTANzo, THIS NATION UNDRR GOD 170-76 (1964).

72. Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. Board of Public
Works of Maryland, 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (CL App. 1966).
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ever substantial, does not render that educational institution legally
ineligible to receive grants for educational purposes. For the lower
and higher court there seems to have been two different "real
issues." The Court of Appeals did not consider whether the buildings to be constructed were for secular purposes and whether secular courses "such as science, English and mathematics, taught at
these institutions are practically identical with the courses at nonreligious colleges." It chose rather to apply the five standards that
the plaintiffs had proposed in ascertaining the degree of connection
of the college with religion and by this calculation determining
whether each college was truly an educational institution or a sectarian institution and as such disqualified under the nonestablishment
clause of receiving governmental assistance in its educational programs identical with the interest of the state. By inserting this
dichotomous leverage between the "objective" nature of the subject
studies and services and the religious affiliation and government
of the school, it disengaged the educational instrumentality and facility from its educational achievements.
Prefatory to these considerations, the Court of Appeals has an
"extended" lengthy disquisition on the "historical background of the
First Amendment" beginning with Pliny's letter to the Roman Emperor Trajan in 112 A.D., no less! One would have hoped by this
time that the American gradual disengagement from ancient animosities and historical complexities would warrant that the Amencan community can now fashion its own history of state-religion
relationships as a unique experiment in "wholesome neutrality," of
accommodation and impartiality, ever sensitive to encroachments
upon religious liberty and prejudicial establishments whether on
theistic or nontheistic grounds. The usefulness of historical reference should not be marred by an implied sense of historical determinism and a Hegelian logism that works out inevitably to foreordained consequences. Governmental grants to specific educational
goals defined in terms of the public interest in no way diminishes
the mutual independence of the state or of the religious institution
nor confer upon the public authority religious functions nor upon
the religious institution any political power The Court is completely
silent about the mutual exchange of students by state, private, and
church-connected schools on all levels during a school term or upon
graduation. Nor is there any awareness of the eligibility, without
discrimination, of students for scholarships and fellowships from
public and private sources. The "real issue" is deflected in the
application of the five factors plus one which measure the degree of
school-church connection. (1) the stated purposes of the college;
(2) the college personnel, which includes the governing board, the
administrative officers, the faculty, and the student body; (3) the
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college's relationship with religious organizations and groups; (4) the
place of religion in the college program; (5) the result or "outcome"
of the college program; such as accreditation and the nature and
character of the activities of the alumni; and (6) the work or image
of the college in the community After applying these criteria to
each of the colleges, the Court concluded that three of the colleges
may not constitutionally receive the state grants. Hood College was
adjudged not to be "sectarian in a legal sense under the First
Amendment, or to a degree that renders the grant invalid thereunder " Further, the Court did admit that the Maryland state statute
making available public funds to a private institution for a public
purpose was not violative of any of the controlling articles of the
Maryland state constitution, namely, Articles 23, 15 and 36.
In corroboration, the Court then quotes at length from. the dissenting opinion of Judge Parke in Board of Education v Wheat"3
which in its literal expression would seem to uphold the constitutionality of such state grants to all four the colleges. This is in fact
what the dissenting opinion of the three justices pointed out, in
repeating the very same quotation:
Neither the payment of money by the State to a private
person, whether corporate or otherwise, not the nature and
occupation of that person, is determinative of the purpose
of the payment. Thus the appropriations by the General
Assembly of public funds are customarily made and paid to
various bodies and institutions through the state, which are
privately owned and managed, and which are, in many
instances, of sectarian origin and character It will be found,
upon examination, that this employment of public moneys
has been sanctioned by the decision of this court. If an
incidental or direct benefit result to the recipient, this resultant advantage becomes immaterial and negligible because of the paramount public and essential nature of the
service rendered and out of the further factor that the State
has either not undertaken or not fully assumed the performance of the public service or function involved. (citation)
The validity of such grants, when so limited, is not affected
by any sectarian circumstance. (citation) Thus, grants to
educational institutions which supply instruction and training
in learning and mechanical, industrial, agricultural and
other arts, of which the State does not offer or undertake to
afford universal service, are freely made without reference
to whether the recipient be denominational or otherwise.
(citation of Maryland cases and legislative grants) Similarly, the grants in aid of the hospitalization of patients for
care and treatment in sickness, injury and disease (citation)
for chronic alcoholism, (citation) for homes for the aged
and infirm, for orphans, for children, for the blind, for
crippled children, for reformatories and for other purposes
73.

Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Ati. 628 (1934).
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which are within the functions of the State as conducive to
the welfare of its inhabitants, and pursuant to the mandate
of the Declaration of Rights: "That the Legislature ought
to encourage the diffusion of knowledge and virtue, the extension of a judicious system of general education, the promotion of literature, the arts, sciences, agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and, the general amelioration of
the condition of the people." Article 43.
In these grants the State advisedly makes no distinction
between denominational and non-denominational institutions,
nor has it limited its appropriations to race or color The
grants so made for special public purposes find at once
their justification and vindication in the promotion of the
general welfare in those matters of public concern in respect
of which the government had not theretofore undertaken
completely to perform. In short although paid to a private
person, the money is appropriated and expended for a public
use.7 4 (Emphasis added.)

Both the majority and the minority opinion quote Justice Parke
but what makes the majority's use of this passage so intriguing is
that the italicized words and lines are supplied by the majority
and not by the minority And the italicized sections are the very
portions of the passage that would have warranted on the part of
the majority a contrary decision, an affirmative one for all of the
four colleges.
The dissentiong opinion of Justice Hammond, in which Justice
Homey and Justice Marbury concurred, pointed to the historical
record of the state of Maryland which has for over a hundred and
eighty years followed a general, systematic and non-discriminatory
pattern of financial assistance to private institutions furnishing a
higher secular education. These grants, the minority opinion stressed,
were under both Maryland law and federal constitutional standards
for a public use and purpose. It quoted, as we have already indicated, the same passage from Justice Parke which literally would
warrant rather than interdict them as constitutionally permissible
provisions. It turned to Everson for its major premise: "It is
much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the
opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public
purpose." While the provision for free bus transportation to a
parochial school is in itself a safety welfare measure properly within the exercises of state police power, the Court had linked that
secular means of travel to an educational process which is religiously orientated and called it a means to a secular education on the implied grounds that the parochial schooling was effectively fulfilling the secular requirements. Translating this valid in74.

Id. at 637.
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terpretation to the case at hand, the minority opinion made its
application with convincing evidence:
the four donee colleges here involved all furnish a secular
liberal arts education comparable to that furnished by other
first rank liberal arts colleges in the United States and are
accredited by standard accrediting agencies. The courses
taught in the four donee colleges are taught in substantially
the same manner as at other similar colleges, for example,
Johns Hopkins or Goucher, adn are not used as vehicles
for religious indoctrination; the text books are chosen by
individual teachers for their merit in supplying knowledge
of the course and are not chosen for their religious orentation or because of the religion of the author and, in most
instances, are the same texts that are used at other public
and private colleges. No doctrine, dogma or other teaching
of any church enters into or interferes with the teaching of
the secular subjects that are taught. Graduates of the four
doneee colleges go on to take graduate studies and obtain
the degrees on an individual basis with graduates of other
public and private colleges at universities offering the best
post graduate courses, such as Johns Hopkins and Columiba.
There are no religious requirements, oral or written, for
admission of students to the donee colleges and, finally, the
buildings to be erected with the funds granted will be places
which will furnish the secular training offered by the colleges and not used for religious ceremonies or instruction.'5
If law should be attendant to the meaning of facts, should it
disregard the universal experience among all colleges and universities of America whose students may transfer from one to another
public, private, and church-connected college,-before the completion of an educational process after graduation? The minority
opinion then describes the vast national need that private colleges
have helped to fulfill and what a large percentage of these the
church-connected colleges constitute. And in testimony of this broad
fact, more than two billion dollars from the federal government is
currently going to private colleges for research contracts, loans, and
outright grants without prejudice to their religious affiliation.
Justice Hammond reviewed the preceding Supreme Court decision and finds in Justice Clark's test enunciated in Schempp a
summary focus of the guidlines by which we are to evaluate what
aids are not constitutive of establishment-a secular means to a
public purpose which is primary in intent and effect of the legislative provision.
There is, lastly, the argument on alternate means from McGowan
75.
Work

Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. Board of Public
of Maryland, 8upra note 72, at 78.
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The minority opinion quotes from a Note
Revzew- 16

in

the

Harvard Law

To exclude these 800 institutions of higher learning. from
federal aid would seriously hamper the effort to increase
enrollment capacity to the point where colleges will be able
to handle the expected demand of 1970 and distort the
present educational allocation of students between denominational and nondenominational school s.
Such pragmatic
considerations would be irrelevant if the command of the
Constitution were clear; the remedy would then be a constitutional amendment. However, the lack of an effective
alternative should be highly relevant when a plausible constitutional defense can be made and where, in an area of
church-state overlap, criteria can be formulated which
minimize governmental intrusion into religious concerns without paralyzing governmental attempts to cope with urgent
national problems.
On the question of constitutionality, the author, at pp. 1356-57
says:
On the other hand, the opinions of Justice Clark and Brennan
in Schempp indicate that federal aid to education would be
considered constitutional. For example, Justice Clark enunciated the test of constitutionality to be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. Similarly Justice Brennan would draw the
line at legislation employing the organs of government for
essentially religious purposes or using essentially religious
means to serve governmental ends where secular means
would suffice. Under either test,
the act would appear to be
7
free from constitutional flaws. "
PROSPECTUS

On November 14, 1966 the United States Supreme Court declined to review78 the Court of Appeals decision and that in effect
left the court's rule controlling in the State of Maryland. Opponents
of federal grants to church colleges have been unable to obtain a
court test because of the Supreme Court's rule announced in 1923
in the case of Massachusetts v Mellon.7 9 This ruling held that
federal taxpayers lacked standing to challenge, m court, expenditures
76. Constitutitonaty of Federal Aid to Church Related Colleges, 77 HAuv. L. REV. 1353,
1358 (1964).
77. Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. Board of Public
Works of Maryland, supra note 72. at 81.
78. Horace Mann League of the United States of America, Inc. v. Board of Public
Works of Maryland, 242 Md. 314, 220 A.2d 51 (Ct. App. 1966), cert. dented, 385 U.S. 97
(1966). The Court also refused to review the decision informing Hood College of the request of the Horace Mann League.
79. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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of United States funds. In the Maryland courts, however, state taxpayers were allowed to contest state grants. The Higher Education
Facilities Act has authorized federal grants for construction of
certain types of buildings at church-related colleges. One can only
speculate why the United States Supreme Court refused to hear the
Maryland case. It may be because it involved only Maryland law
The federal government was not a party to the litigation in any
way According to the federal program of assistance to higher and
lower levels of education, grants may be made to private and churchrelated colleges to help finance institutes under the National Defense Education Act and to such schools under the developing college
program. It is a fair conjecture that the federal programs involved
in these assistances and financial subventions add up to $1.6 billion
dollars to private colleges and a $1 billion dollar plan for aid to
elementary and secondary education. In the expectation that someday the United States Supreme Court will agree to review this momentous question on governmental aid to church-connected schools,
whether of the higher or lower level, we here submit certain criteria
derived from preceding court decisions in the light of which we may
conjecture the ultimate determination of this controversial issue.
First, both government and religious communities have concurrent interests and functions in many areas of general welfare,
including education. Second, the identity of goals, the competence
and efficiency of the religious educational instrumentalities may be
tested and ascertained empirically Third, the public law should
take cognizance of the broad and long-standing experience of the
academy itself which gives witness to the identity of secular goals
realized in the diversity of publicly accredited schools by the mutual
exchange of students during a school term and after graduation.
To this too must be added the government confirmed belief in the
competence of state, private and church-connected schools to fulfill
its goals by granting to the diversity of the schools without any
discrimination on basis of religion those grants and research contracts. Fourth, an unreal objection often arises to distract from
concentrating on the real issue, the secular services and studies of
the church-connected schools. It is said that such aids benefit
the institution itself. Undoubtedly' Negatively considered, deny all
governmental assistance to these church colleges and universities
and extend them only to state and private secular institutions and
the series of consequences to their disadvantage may be easily conjectured. Positively considered, extend these benefactions to these
religious institutions in the government's own interest and that of
its citizens, and the consequent benefit to the enrollment, to students, and the faculty can scarcely be denied. The objection is
unreal because it blinds itself to the nature and operation of
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almost all human acts and conduct, whether private or public.
Fifth, there is more often than not multiple effects rather than
singleness of outcome. Nor can one constrain all efficiency to a
predetermined end. There is generally an overflow of consequences.
Good and evil, private or governmental, are diffusive of themselves.
If the legislative secular purpose and primary effect is realized
through an agency that admits to a religious confession then one
would suppose all the better for it. To insert a religious exclusionary
rule because of an overflow of benefits offends civility no less than
common sense. Sixth, Everson denied that such a religious exclusionary rule may interject between the recipients of a governmental assistance directed to secular education in church-schools.
Whoever than invokes the phrase "neither advances religion" must
give m its complementary entirety the Supreme Court's own proposition, "that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Only in this
wise will it be possible to achieve the delicate balance of preserving
on the one hand religious liberty in education and on the other
forbid what constitutes establishment. Seventh, the neutrality
between believers, on the one hand, and between believers and nonbelievers on the other, affirmed in Torcaso, will be absolute, showing favoritism neither to one nor the other by weighting government
power, influence, and prestige on the side of one educational process.
The "wholesome neutrality" of which Mr Justice Clark spoke of in
Schempp, will be regulated by identifying the governmental interest
whereseoever it is done with no prejudice to the exercise of religious
liberty in education. Eighth, in the use of historical precedents on
the union of church and state, of Altar and Throne, of state church
establishments with all their incidents of civil disabilities and oppression to dictates of conscience, we counsel caution against an implied
sense of historical determinism and a species of Hegelian a prIori
ergotisms. The American community and its political and legal
institutions have gradually disengaged themselves from the socialpolitical-religious inheritance of their European forebears. They have
a right as well as the awesome responsibility of fashioning their
own church-state relations without evoking ancient fears and animosities. There is discernible an "American way" of doing things
and it is this unique pragmatic American approach and not the dead
heavy hand of the past that should guide our decisions. In conclusion, we suggest that in order to dispel the incubus of the logic
of past events and to affirm our own freedom of force and action,
the time has come for the United States Congress to make a full
and complete evaluation of the church schools and ascertain to its
own satisfaction whether or not they may participate as authentic
educational facilities in the goals of national education and whether
they are beneficial to our democratic institutions.
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We are convinced that properly defined relationships of mutual
cooperation where there is an identity of goals, a concurrence of
functions and of interests, is a proper implementation of the unique
American experiment in the separation of church and state. And
we are firmly convinced that by these arrangements both church
and state will remain free and unhampered by each other in the
performance of their divinely-ordained and constitutional functions.

